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This Doctoral thesis includes three articles. In Heterogeneity of Incentive E ects on Elicited Guilt Aversion,
I study guilt intended as the feeling that arises when we think we disappoint others’ expectations. I
investigate how the anticipated cost of guilt is traded-o  with financial incentives in the investment
game. I also explore the characteristics of guilt averse participants with respect to personality traits. In
Matching and Confidence, I study how matching a ects confidence. In collaboration with Friederike
Mengel (University of Essex and Lund University) and Mehmet Yigit Gurdal (Bogazici University), we
use an experiment that allows us to identify the e ect of being matched with others of either similar
or dissimilar performance (assortative or disassortative matching) on people’s confidence in their own
ability. In Incidental A ects, Belief Management, and Decision-Making, I use a lab experiment to study
how incidental a ects - immediate emotions unrelated to the judgement at hand - influence decisions and
beliefs in two classical choice situations: a dictator game and an e ort task.
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Heterogeneity of Incentive E ects




An increasing amount of empirical studies suggests that in many strategic interactions, people’s preferences
depend on guilt aversion. This paper explores the presence of heterogeneity in the way people experience
guilt under di erent incentive schemes and studies the influence of personality traits on elicited guilt aversion.
We use an experiment where participants play three rounds of the investment game by Berg, Dickhaut and
McCabe (1995) with di erent rates of return. At the end, participants complete a Big-Five questionnaire.
The results reveal significant heterogeneity in the way people trade-o  guilt and monetary incentives with a
prevalence of players for which guilt aversion - measured as the correlation between second order beliefs and
choices - decreases as the stakes in the game become higher. The analysis of the personality data suggests that
guilt aversion is negatively correlated to openness to experience and positively correlated with neuroticism.
All the results are robust upon controlling for standard measures of guilt proneness and compliance used in
psychology.




In many strategic interactions, people’s preferences are belief-dependent. Specifically, it has been shown
that preferences depend on the beliefs people hold about others’ expectations, and not only on their material
payo . A possible explanation for the importance of expectations on people’s preferences involves the
concept of guilt. People can feel guilty when they fail to live up to others’ expectations (Baumeister
et al., 1994). Classic guilt aversion models (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) assume that a feeling of
guilt arises when people believe their behavior is responsible for the disappointment of others. When
individuals are guilt averse, their choices should be positively correlated to what they think others expect
from them (their second order beliefs).
A fast-growing empirical literature has been testing the predictions of guilt aversion models by
investigating the correlation between choices, and either the decision makers’ self-reported second order
beliefs or the counterparts’ expectations (first order beliefs) revealed to the decision makers before the
choices are made. Many studies provide evidence that supports the guilt aversion hypothesis (Dufwenberg
and Gneezy, 2000; Guerra and Zizzo, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Bacharach et al., 2007;
Reuben et al., 2009; Bellemare et al., 2011; Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Hauge, 2016; Khalmetski, 2016),
while some authors challenge this conclusion (Ellingsen et al., 2010; Vanberg, 2008; Kawagoe and Narita,
2014). A number of attempts have been made to explain those seemingly conflicting findings (Bellemare
et al., 2017a; Balafoutas and Fornwagner, 2017; Khalmetski et al., 2015) and some authors suggest that
understanding the contextual and individual factors that interact with guilt aversion is crucial (Khalmetski
et al., 2015). Still, the topic is poorly explored.
There are reasons to believe that the incentive scheme in a game might be a source of heterogeneity.
Indeed, people might respond di erently to the beliefs of others when the incentive scheme in a game
varies, ultimately producing a significant interaction between guilt aversion and monetary incentives. For
instance, some individuals that are not guilt averse when the stakes in a game are low might feel guilty
when the monetary incentives in the game are high enough. Other individuals that are guilt averse when
the stakes in a game are low might decide to consider only their material payo  when the monetary
incentives become significantly large. Finally, some individuals might be guilt averse, regardless of the
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level of monetary incentives. Analyzing individual heterogeneity across di erent incentive schemes is
crucial for understanding under which circumstances guilt aversion is likely to play a role.
This paper investigates how the rate of return in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995) interacts
with guilt aversion, measured as the correlation between second order beliefs and choices. We use an
experiment where participants play three rounds of the investment game with di erent rates of return and
explore the presence of heterogeneity in the way people experience guilt under the di erent incentive
schemes both at the aggregate and within-subject level. The results indicate that, on average, the coe cient
of the interaction term between second order beliefs and choices becomes smaller as the rate of return
increases. The within-subject analysis provides evidence of individual heterogeneity in the way people
trade-o  guilt and monetary incentives. For 60% of the participants considered in the analysis, the
interaction term between second order beliefs and choices is not significantly a ected by the rate of
return, suggesting that the incentive scheme does not influence guilt aversion; among the rest there is a
strong prevalence of participants for which the interaction term decreases with the rate of return.
To single out the characteristics of guilt averse participants, we analyze the influence of personality
traits on guilt aversion. We collect data on personality traits using a Big-Five questionnaire (Costa Jr.
and McCrae, 1992) and study the relationship between each Big-Five and the guilt aversion elicited in
the investment game. We use two measures of guilt aversion. One captures ‘unconditionally’ guilt
averse subjects (whose correlation coe cient between second order beliefs and choices is not a ected
by the incentive scheme) while the other considers the average correlation across the three rounds of the
game. In the sample, we observe a significant negative correlation between guilt aversion and openness to
experience, regardless of the definition of guilt aversion used. Moreover, neurotic players are more likely
to be ‘unconditionally’ guilt averse. Those e ects are robust upon controlling for standard measures of
guilt proneness and compliance used in psychology.
This study is linked to the emerging literature studying heterogeneity in guilt aversion (Khalmetski
et al., 2015; Attanasi et al., 2016, 2013; Bellemare et al., 2017b). The work most closely related to ours is
Bellemare et al. (2017b). The authors analyze the trade-o  between people’s regards for their own payo 
and letting down others across stakes in a mini-dictator game. They found that 60% of the participants in
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their experiment display a stake-dependent guilt aversion. Among those subjects, 10% have a sensitivity
to guilt that is increasing with the stake while for 24% it is decreasing. Those results are not directly
comparable with ours since Bellemare et al. (2017b) rely on a di erent theoretical specification and
experimental design. Nonetheless, the outcomes of our experiment are in agreement with Bellemare et al.
(2017b) as our study reports a significant proportion of participants with stake-dependent guilt aversion
and, among them, there is a prevalence of participants for which guilt aversion decreases with the stakes
in the game.
This paper recognizes the importance of personality traits in economic decisions and is the first study
to explore their significance in a belief-dependent preferences framework. Several studies have shown
that personality traits predict economic outcomes in the fields of education, health, labor market or crime
(for a review of the literature see Almlund et al., 2011). Personality variables have been found to be more
predictive than standard measures of cognition (Heckman et al., 2013) and more flexible over the life cycle
(Cunha et al., 2010). Knowing how personality traits relate to guilt aversion is crucial to understanding
the multiple influences that intervention targeting personality might generate and to assess how guilt
aversion can be moderated via institutional design. Our research provides evidence of a robust link
between personality traits and guilt aversion, as measured by the correlation between second order beliefs
and choices. The result is strong, especially considering that other studies tried to relate experimental
measures of trust (e.g., amount sent by the first player in the investment game) and reciprocity (e.g.,
amount returned by the second player) to personality traits (Evans and Revelle, 2008; Fahr and Irlenbusch,
2008; Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Becker et al., 2012; Müller and Schwieren, 2012) finding at most
weak relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. In section
3, we present the theoretical background and the empirical strategy. In section 4, we show the results and
discuss them. Section 5 concludes. The appendices report details of the experimental instructions.
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2 Experimental design and procedures
2.1 Design
The experiment is structured in 3 phases: investment game, survey phase, and risk game. At the end of
the experiment, participants are asked to complete a post-experimental questionnaire with demographics.
Phase 1: Investment game. We employ a variation of the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In the
game, two participants are paired, and one of them (A-player or A) is endowed with an amount of money
(4 pounds). The A-player is asked to decide how much of her initial endowment she wants to transfer
to the other player (B-player or B). The amount chosen by A is multiplied by the rate of return and then
given to B. After receiving the amount, B decides how much to keep and how much to send back to A.
Before playing the game, participants are randomly assigned one role - either A or B - and must answer
a question that tests their understanding of how payo s are calculated to be able to proceed.1 Once they
provide the correct answer, they enter the belief elicitation stage. Each B-player is asked to guess the most
common transfer that will be chosen by As in the room. Similarly, each A-player is requested to guess the
most common amount that Bs will give back. Since the decision of the B-player depends on the amount
received by A, the A-players have to make four di erent guesses, one for each possible level of transfer
received by Bs (i.e., 1, 2, 3 or 4 multiplied by the rate of return). Figure 1 reproduces the belief elicitation
stage when the rate of return is 3. Analogous procedures are in place for rates of return 1 and 5. To avoid
any source of confusion, the reward scheme is simple and correct guesses are compensated with 1 pound
(B-player) or 50 Cents (A-player).2
1If the answer provided is wrong, a warning window appears on the screen indicating the inappropriateness of the response
and suggesting the range of value for the correct answer. During the experiment, two participants made several unsuccessful
attempts and were not able to proceed, so they asked for assistance. The experimenter gave them a brief explanation of the
game and payo  calculation. After the additional explanation, everybody gave the right answer and was able to proceed.
2The belief elicitation protocol invites rational participants to report the mode of their prior probability distribution. We
choose this incentive scheme instead of other proper scoring rules because it is simple and easy to describe in instructions. As
the A-players have four chances of getting a reward and Bs just one, it seems reasonable to o er di erent payments.
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A-player
When Players B receive 3 pounds, the amount most frequently returned is: ...
When Players B receive 6 pounds, the amount most frequently returned is: ...
When Players B receive 9 pounds, the amount most frequently returned is: ...
When Players B receive 12 pounds, the amount most frequently returned is: ...
B-player
What do you think is the most common amount chosen by Players A when the rate of return is 3? ...
Figure 1: Belief elicitation stage when the rate of return is 3.
After the belief elicitation stage, each A-player is randomly matched with a B-player, and the game
starts. Participants make their choices using a variant of the strategy method (Selten, 1967) akin to
Khalmetski et al. (2015). First, the A-player is asked to make her choice of transfer for every possible
guess of her matched B. The transfer corresponding to the true guess of the matched B-player is then
selected, multiplied by the rate of return, and assigned to B. Afterwards, the B-player is asked to determine
the amount to give back for every possible guess of his matched A.3 The back transfer corresponding
to the actual guess of the matched A-player is calculated, and the game ends. Figure 2 reproduces the
decision stage when the rate of return is 3, assuming that the A-player transfers 1 pound to her matched
B. Analogous procedures are in place for di erent levels of transfer and rates of return. Note that the
choice set of B depends on the amount received by his matched A-player. As a consequence, Bs receiving
di erent amounts face a di erent array of possible choices. Appendix A displays screen-shots of the
decision stage of B receiving 6 and 9 pounds.
A-Player
If the guess of my matched Player B is 0, I transfer him/her the following amount: ...
If the guess of my matched Player B is 1, I transfer him/her the following amount: ...
If the guess of my matched Player B is 2, I transfer him/her the following amount: ...
If the guess of my matched Player B is 3, I transfer him/her the following amount: ...
If the guess of my matched Player B is 4, I transfer him/her the following amount: ...
B-Player
You received 3 pounds from A.
If the guess of my matched Player A is 0, I give him/her back the following amount: ...
If the guess of my matched Player A is 1, I give him/her back the following amount: ...
If the guess of my matched Player A is 2, I give him/her back the following amount: ...
If the guess of my matched Player A is 3, I give him/her back the following amount: ...
Figure 2: Decision stage when the rate of return is 3. We are assuming that A transfers 1 pound.
All participants play the game three times under di erent treatment conditions corresponding to the
3If the A-player transfers 0, the matched B-player skips this stage. He is simply asked to wait, and he is not informed that
his counterpart transferred nothing. The possibility of long waiting time in the game was anticipated before the start of the
experiment with a generic announcement.
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rates of return 1, 3 and 5 (treatments R1, R3, and R5 respectively).4 They are informed that they will
keep the same role - either A or B - in all the rounds of the game. To minimize learning, participants
always play with a di erent counterpart and receive feedback on the payo s from the game only after the
last round has been played. To avoid strategic reporting of beliefs, the beliefs for all the rates of return
are elicited before the start of the game, and in the belief elicitation stage, participants are not told that
their belief will be relevant to the payo  calculation.5 The order of treatment is randomized.6
Phase 2: Survey phase. We use psychological surveys to measure personality traits, proneness to guilt
and tendency to comply with group standards. The Big Five personality traits - openness to experience,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism - are measured with the NEO Five Factory
Revised (NEO FFI-R). This survey is the short version of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO
PI-R) by Costa Jr. and McCrae (1992). The NEO FFI-R contains 60 items, 12 per trait. Each item is a
statement about oneself (e.g., ‘I am not a worrier’) for which participants report their level of agreement
on a 5-point Likert scale. Each Big Five is measured as the sum of the response to the 12 items referring
to the trait. Big Five scores represent degrees of the personality traits; more extreme scorers have a higher
probability of showing the distinctive features of the trait as reported in table 1.
We measure guilt proneness with the guilt scale of the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP)
(Cohen et al., 2011).7 The GASP allows separating guilt from shame. Guilt is considered the result of
some evaluation focused on one’s behavior (‘I did a bad thing’) in a situation where the bad behavior has
not been publicly exposed. In contrast, shame is defined as an evaluation on one’s self (‘I am a bad person’)
after failures are publicly exposed. The GASP is the only scale that considers both the self-behavior and
private-public distinction. Considering that in the experiment decisions are anonymous, the non-public
exposure of the behavior seems an important dimension, and this is the reason why we chose GASP over
4In the investment game, R>1 as both players must be better o  when trust occurs (Alós-Ferrer and Farolfi, 2019). In the
experiment, we consider the case R=1 as a baseline treatment. Nonetheless, to simplify the exposition, we refer to the baseline
treatment as a round of the investment game.
5There is no reason to believe that not disclosing the information could mislead or deceive participants since players
make choices using the strategy method, without getting to know the actual belief of the counterpart in the decision stage.
Khalmetski et al. (2015) use a similar design.
6The beliefs elicitation stage and the investment game follow the same order of treatment.
7We slightly changed the choice of words in one of the items to make it more appropriate for an English student-based
subject pool. Details are provided in Appendix B.
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other more widely used guilt assessment scale such as TOSCA-3 (Tangney et al., 2000) that does not
make the distinction.8
Trait Distinctive features of high scorer in the trait
Openness to experience Curious, willing to entertain novel ideas and unconventional values. Experienc-
ing both positive and negative emotions more keenly than do closed individuals.
Conscientiousness Purposeful, strong-willed, and determined. Scrupulous, punctual, and reliable.
Extraversion Sociable, assertive, active, and talkative. Upbeat, energetic and optimistic.
Agreeableness Altruistic, sympathetic to others and eager to help them. Believing that others
will be equally helpful in return.
Neuroticism Tendency to experience negative a ects, inability to control impulses, poor
coping with stress.
Table 1: Big Five traits, distinctive features.
The GASP measures emotional traits (guilt proneness) rather than emotional states (transitory feelings
of guilt). The guilt scale of GASP is formed of 8 statements describing situations that people could face
in day-to-day life followed by typical ways of responding to those situations (e.g. ‘You lie to people but
they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel terrible about the lies you told?’).
Participants are asked to report the likelihood that they would react as it is described on a 7-point Likert
scale. Guilt proneness corresponds to the average of the scores of the 8 items. Appendix B reports the
complete questionnaire.
Finally, we measure the tendency to be susceptible to social influence and group pressures with the
Cooperativeness scale of the Jackson Personality Inventory Revised (JPI-R)(Jackson, 2004). The survey
is formed of 20 items, each item is a statement about oneself (e.g., ‘I am very sensitive to what other
people think of me’) for which participants should indicate if they think the statement is true or false. The
cooperativeness variable is the sum of the scores that indicate a propensity to cooperate. A person scoring
high on the cooperativeness scale is susceptible to social influence and group pressure and tends to modify
behavior to be consistent with standards set by others. This last measure further helps distinguishing guilt
aversion from a generic motivation of social compliance possibly experienced by players.
8Bracht and Regner (2013) used the GASP scale in the context of guilt aversion.
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Phase 3: Risk elicitation. In the last phase, participants are asked to take part in a risk game which
uses the classical multiple price list method of Holt and Laury (2002). Each participant has to compare
a list of 10 decisions between paired lotteries A and B. Along with this list of choices, the transition
from the less risky gamble A to the more risky gamble B is rewarded by an increased risk premium. The
number of safe choices returns a measure of individual risk attitudes.
Participants are paid one randomly chosen payo  from the investment game, the rewards for the correct
beliefs in all the treatments, the payment for the survey, the outcome of the risk game and the show-up
fee. The order in which participants face the investment game and the survey is balanced across sessions.
The risk game is always played at the end, before the post-experimental questionnaire.
2.2 Procedure
The experiment took place in April and May 2017 at the EssexLab of the University of Essex. The
participants were recruited through the ESSEXLab Online Recruitment System and invited to take part
in a computerized session at the lab on campus. The research received Ethical Approval from the Social
Sciences Faculty Ethics Sub-Committee of the University of Essex. Conforming to departmental ethics
guidelines and current practice in experimental research with human subjects, participants read and signed
informed consent before taking part in the session. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The research involved 144 participants; more than 90% were students. Experimental sessions consisted
of 24 or 30 participants.9 Written instructions were distributed at the beginning of each session. All
participants received the same instructions. For the complete set of instructions, see Appendix C.
The sessions lasted on average 85 minutes, including random assignment to cubicles, reading the
instructions, answering the post-experimental questionnaire and receiving payments. The participants
earned between 8 and 31 pounds (including the show-up fee), with an average of 16.93 pounds.
9A pilot session with 12 participants was run two weeks before the experimental sessions. The pilot session ran smoothly,
and the data are included in the analysis.
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3 Theoretical background
The player of interest for our analysis is B. The reason is that the conditional choices of the A-players
cannot have a clear interpretation in terms of belief-dependent preferences as they might be driven by
strategic considerations. For instance, the A-players might think that the B-players with higher first
order beliefs are also willing to give back higher amounts. In this case, a positive correlation between
conditional transfers and beliefs would be driven by As’ willingness to maximize payo  and not guilt
aversion. In this section, we briefly introduce a guilt aversion model applied to the B-player of our
experiment and outline the empirical strategy.
3.1 Guilt aversion model
We assume that B has belief-dependent preferences according to a model of guilt aversion adapted from
Khalmetski et al. (2015).10 In the game, B decides an amount ti 2 [0, xi R] to send back to A, where xi is
the transfer received from A and R the rate of return. A holds a probability distribution over B’s actions
and beliefs.11 We denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of A’s first order beliefs as FA and the
corresponding probability density function (pdf) as fA. The cdf of B’s second order beliefs conditional
on the amount transferred by A is defined as FBA(z) = EB[FA | xi], and the pdf is fBA(z), where z is a
random variable taking values on all his possible conditional second order beliefs.
B faces a trade-o  between his material payo  (mi) and a psychological cost stemming from anticipated
guilt. The utility from material payo  is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave (m0i > 0, m00i < 0).
Given that B’s monetary outcome is xi R   ti, his utility function is:
Ui(ti, fBA) = mi(xi R   ti)    i max{0,EB[z   ti | z   ti]}
where max{0,EB[z   ti | z   ti]} is B’s level of guilt from falling below A’s expectations and  i measures
10Khalmetski et al. (2015) assume that people not only care about not disappointing others but may also get utility from
positively surprising. Since the focus of this paper is on guilt aversion, we simplify their model by assuming that the propensity
to make positive surprises is zero.
11As Khalmetski et al. (2015) note, ‘the distribution-wise representation of beliefs provides a natural way to make the
optimal transfer monotonically changing with the second order belief.’
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guilt sensitivity.
B is unaware of A’s first order belief, but he observes an informative signal ✓ j which is equal to the
median of FBA(z) and corresponds to A’s elicited belief in the experiment. Assuming that a higher value
of the signal ✓ j , induces first order stochastic dominance in the conditional distribution of beliefs FBA
conditional on a lower signal, the strategy method returns a mapping of signals ✓ j (and hence beliefs)
to back transfers t⇤i (✓ j). Under a few additional assumptions,12 Khalmetski et al. (2015) show that if a
player is guilt averse ( i > 0), t⇤i (✓ j) is systematically positively correlated with i’s induced second order
beliefs.13
3.2 Empirical strategy
Building on the implications of the model introduced in the previous section, we aim to study three aspects
of guilt aversion. Before introducing them and the statistical strategy, we care to clarify the terminology
adopted throughout the rest of the paper. We use the term ‘second order beliefs’ to refer to B’s second
order beliefs induced by the strategy method after observing the transfer received by A. Hence, we are
not referring to B’s initial beliefs but rather his conditional second order beliefs (Attanasi et al., 2016).
3.2.1 Guilt aversion
We study the correlation between conditional choices and second order beliefs to compare our results
to other studies on guilt aversion. First, we use a non-parametric correlation test both at the aggregate
and within-subject level, separately for each treatment. Then, we estimate the coe cients of the linear
regression model:
Conditional back transferir = ↵ +  1Second order beliefir +  2Treatmentr +  3Xi + ✏ir (1)
12The assumptions are: B has some preferences regarding guilt ( i > 0); B’s marginal monetary cost of giving back is
larger than half of his sensitivity to guilt m‘i(1   ti)  
 i
2 ; FBA(z | ✓ 0j) is continuously di erentiable on [0, xiR]x[0, xiR]. We
refer to Khalmetski et al. (2015) for a discussion on the assumptions.
13As the stated results can be directly derived from the model of Khalmetski et al. (2015) by assuming that the propensity
to make positive surprises is zero, we refer to their paper for the formal proof of the results.
12
where Treatment contains indicator variables for each treatment r with r 2 R = {1, 3, 5}, and Xi is a
set of individual-level controls. We use a panel approach to perform the analysis at the aggregate level and
obtain average guilt aversion for each treatment. Then, we perform the same regression but within-subject
to analyze the presence of heterogeneity in the sample.
3.2.2 Interaction between guilt aversion and the incentive scheme
We study the interaction between guilt aversion and the rate of return. This is an original contribution of
the paper. As mentioned in the introduction, there are reasons to believe that guilt aversion might interact
with the incentive scheme in the game as people might trade-o  their feeling of guilt with material payo .
We estimate the regression:
Conditional back transferir = ↵ +  1Second order beliefir +  2Treatmentr
+  3Treatment x Second order beliefir +  4Xi + ✏ir (2)
Also in this case, we perform the analysis both at the aggregate and within-subject level to comment
on individual heterogeneity in the sample.
3.2.3 Guilt aversion and personality traits
To analyze the influence of personality traits on guilt aversion, we estimate the parameters of the linear
regression model:
Guilt aversioni = ↵ +  1Openness to experiencei +  2Conscientiousnessi +  3Extraversioni
+  4Agreeablenessi +  5Neuroticismi +  6Zi + ✏i (3)
where Zi is a vector of control variables. We employ two definitions of guilt aversion - one discrete
and one continuous. First, we calculate the within-subject correlation coe cients between second order
beliefs and choices for every treatment. Then, for the discrete definition, we construct a dummy variable
which assumes value 1 for participants whose correlation coe cient is positive and significant (at least
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at 5% level) in all treatments. For the continuous definition of guilt aversion, we take the average of the
correlation coe cients across treatments. It follows that the discrete definition captures ‘unconditionally’
guilt averse participants.14
4 Results
In the following sections, we report the results of the experiment. First, we present descriptive statistics
concerning the investment game and the psychological surveys. Then, we introduce the main findings.
4.1 Descriptives
4.1.1 Investment game
We present descriptive statistics concerning the realized back transfer - intended as the back transfer
corresponding to the actual guess of A in each pair of players - and the conditional back transfer.
Realized back transfer
Figure 3 displays the frequency of the realized transfers and back transfers in each treatment. The graphs
on the left hand side of the figure show the number of A-players choosing the amount reported on the
x-axis. The bars are coloured in di erent shades of grey with lighter shades indicating lower amounts.
The majority of the A-players (23 players) transfers 0 in R1. As the rate of return increases, the A-players
more frequently transfer positive amounts (56 players in R3 and 63 in R5). The graphs on the right of
figure 3 show the number of B-players choosing the amount reported on the x-axis as a back transfer. The
bars coloured in di erent shades of grey correspond to the amount received from the A-players. Since
the game is played sequentially, the B-players receiving 0 from their matched A-players do not make
any decision. Hence, the lightest shade of grey is missing from the right side of figure 3.15 Among the
B-players receiving positive transfers, the majority transfers back 0 in R1 (71% of the players). As the
14With ‘unconditional’ we mean that the rate of return does not change the degree of guilt aversion of a participant.
15Note that the number of A-players transferring 0 under each rate of return corresponds to the number of missing
observation for B-players in each treatment. The sample size of B-players is indicated in the caption of figure 3.
14
rate of return increases a higher proportion of B-players back transfer positive amounts (60% in R3 and
78% in R5).
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the B-players’ first order beliefs and realized back transfers. As
expected, B-players expect to receive more as the rate of return increases - 1.43 in R1, 1.92 in R3 and 2.37
in R5. Moreover, within each treatment the B-players back transfer more the more they received from the
As. Also, given the same amount received from the As, the mean amount back transferred increases with
the rate of return.
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Transfer Back transfer by transfer received
Figure 3: Frequency of realized transfer (left) and back transfer (right) by treatment. Di erent shades of grey
correspond to di erent amounts of realized transfers (lighter shades indicate lower amounts). The sample size of
A-players is 72 in every treatment. The sample size of B-players is 49 in R1, 55 in R3, and 63 in R5.
It is worth noting that the mean back transfer and belief in the three treatment conditions do not vary
significantly according to whether the participants first play the game and then complete the survey or
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vice versa. To test the order e ect in the experimental phases, we performed a two-sample t-tests with
equal variances for each treatment, and none of the di erences is significant. Also, the order of treatments
does not significantly a ect choices and beliefs. To test the order e ect in treatments, we run a Bonferroni
multiple-comparison test, and none of the pairwise di erences between treatment orders is significant.
Mean (SD) Observations
R1 Belief on transfer 1.43 (1.18) 72
Back transfer if transfer=1 0.11 (0.32) 19
if transfer=2 0.38 (0.59) 21
if transfer=3 1.00 (1.41) 4
if transfer=4 1.40 (1.34) 5
R3 Belief on transfer 1.92 (0.95) 72
Back transfer if transfer=1 0.52 (0.71) 25
if transfer=2 1.67 (1.75) 18
if transfer=3 2.62 (3.20) 8
if transfer=4 5.75 (2.06) 4
R5 Belief on transfer 2.37 (1.26) 72
Back transfer if transfer=1 1.09 (1.24) 23
if transfer=2 1.59 (1.58) 17
if transfer=3 6.27 (3.98) 11
if transfer=4 7.08 (5.12) 12
Table 2: Mean beliefs and realized back transfers of B-players split by level of transfer received from A.
The mean values are split by treatment.
The outcomes described for the realized back transfer is similar to that observed in other experiments
using the investment game with multiple rates of return (for a meta-analysis see Johnson and Mislin,
2011). This finding supports the validity of the experimental design. In fact, the strategy method could
potentially bias choices by inducing a demand e ect. Considering the outcome of the game, the demand
e ect does not seem to be significant.
Conditional back transfer
In this section, we consider all the choices of back transfer conditional on As’ beliefs. We collected data
on 1,073 conditional back transfers across 72 B-players.
Purely outcome-based utility theories (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) predict
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that a rational player should choose the same back transfer for any level of A’s beliefs as beliefs should
not a ect choices. Hence, those theories predict no variation in the conditional choices made by B-
players with the strategy method. However, this is not the case. In R1, 22 B-players (45%) change
their conditional choice at least once. Excluding the choices conditional on a transfer equal to 1 - which
grants only two options in B’s choice set -, the percentage rises to 67% (20 players over 30). In R3, 39
players (71%) change their choice at least once, and 50 (79%) do so in R5.16 Hence, the results of the
experiment strongly suggest that preferences in the game are belief-dependent and not only driven by
purely outcome-based motives.
Figure 4 displays the frequency of conditional back transfers in the three treatments. The graphs on
the left show the frequency of conditional choices equal to the amount reported on the x-axis. As before,
the bars are coloured in di erent shades of grey with lighter shades indicating lower amounts. The graphs
on the right show how the conditional back transfers are distributed across the various levels of As’ beliefs
reported on the x-axis. For instance, consider the bar in the lightest shade of grey on the left side of the
graph. In R1, the B-players choose 85 times to back transfer 0, conditional on any level of beliefs. The
bars in the lightest shade of grey on the right indicate how back transfers of 0 are distributed across the
various level of first order beliefs of A. In R1, the B-players choose 0 80% of the times when A believes
to receive back 0. The proportion of 0 back transfers decreases as the level of As’ beliefs increases (63%
if As’ believe to receive back 1, 37% if 2, 22% if 3), except when A expects to receive 4 (40%). Overall,
figure 4 shows that in all the treatments, the proportion of 0 choices almost monotonically decreases as
A’s beliefs increases. Also, the B-players tend to choose higher back transfer conditional on higher levels
of As’ beliefs as guilt aversion models would predict.
Table 3 displays summary statistics of the B-players’ conditional back transfers. The mean conditional
back transfer is monotonically increasing in As’ beliefs in all treatments. Given the same level of As’
belief, the mean amount back transferred is increasing with the rate of return with few exceptions.
16The sample size is 55 in R3, and 63 in R5, which corresponds to the number of B-players receiving a positive transfer in
those treatments.
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Conditional back transfers A’s first order beliefs
Figure 4: Frequency of conditional back transfers by treatment. On the right side, conditional back transfers are split
by the corresponding level of A’s belief. Di erent shades of grey correspond to di erent amounts of conditional back
transfers (lighter shades indicate lower amounts). The sample size is 142 in R1, 330 in R3, and 601 in R5.
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Mean (SD) Observations
R1 Conditional back transfer if A’s first order belief = 0 0.26 (0.57) 49
if A’s first order belief = 1 0.45 (0.65) 49
if A’s first order belief = 2 0.93 (0.87) 30
if A’s first order belief = 3 1.67 (1.32) 9
if A’s first order belief = 4 1.80 (1.79) 5
R3 Conditional back transfer if A’s first order belief = 0 0.67 (1.50) 55
if A’s first order belief = 1 0.98 (1.50) 55
if A’s first order belief = 2 1.36 (1.52) 55
if A’s first order belief = 3 1.44 (1.86) 55
if A’s first order belief = 4-6 2.13 (1.93) 30
if A’s first order belief > 6 3.45 (2.76) 12
R5 Conditional back transfer if A’s first order belief = 0 0.90 (1.99) 63
if A’s first order belief = 1 1.62 (2.18) 63
if A’s first order belief = 2 1.98 (2.17) 63
if A’s first order belief = 3 2.29 (2.43) 63
if A’s first order belief = 4 2.52 (2.43) 63
if A’s first order belief = 5 2.60 (2.37) 63
if A’s first order belief = 5-10 4.59 (3.32) 40
if A’s first order belief > 10 6.61 (4.91) 23
Table 3: Mean conditional back transfers of the B-players split by level of As’ first order beliefs. The
mean values are split by treatment.
4.1.2 Surveys
Table 4 reports summary statistics on the psychological surveys.17
Variable name Value Range Mean (SD) Min Value Max Value
Openness to experience 0-60 31.40 (6.60) 13 48
Conscientiousness 0-60 30.61 (8.22) 10 47
Extraversion 0-60 28.89 (7.97) 12 45
Agreeableness 0-60 31.07 (6.86) 14 44
Neuroticism 0-60 24.28 (8.19) 7 46
GASP 0-7 5.46 (0.89) 2.87 7
JPI-cooperativeness 0-20 7.01 (3.71) 0 14
Table 4: Surveys: summary statistics. Sample size: 72 B-players.
The mean values obtained in all the surveys are fairly similar to the normative values obtained for the
general population (for details on the normative values see Costa Jr. and McCrae 1992, Cohen et al. 2011,
and Jackson 2004).
17Even if all the 144 participants to the experiment took part in the survey phase, the table presents data referring to the
sample of 72 B-players only. Note that there are no statistically significant di erences between the B-players and the A-players
for all the variables under analysis.
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Result 1 - Guilt aversion
In this section, we analyze data on conditional back transfer to check whether B-players’ choices and
second order beliefs are systematically correlated. We perform correlation and regression analysis both
at the aggregate and within-subject level.
A simple Spearman correlation test between conditional back transfers and second order beliefs, reveals
a positive and strongly significant correlation between the two variables in each treatment. The correlation
coe cient in R1 is 0.4765 (p-value<.001), 0.3646 (p-value<.001) in R3, and 0.4689 (p-value<.001) in
R5.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of coe cients resulting from the within-subject correlation analysis
between conditional back transfers and second order beliefs performed separately for each treatment. The
vast majority of the coe cients are positive, suggesting that many subjects might be motivated by guilt
aversion.
Figure 5: Distribution of the coe cients resulting from
the within-subject correlation analysis between conditional
back transfers and second order beliefs performed by treat-
ment.
Figure 6: Proportion of B-players changing their choice
of conditional back-transfer at least once - light grey bars -
and having a positive and significant (at least at 5% level)
within-subject correlation - dark grey bars.
Figure 6 displays the percentage of B-players changing their conditional choice at least once - light
grey bars - and having a correlation coe cient positive and significant at least at 5% level according to
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a Spearman correlation test - dark grey bars - in each treatment.18 The B-players represented with dark
grey bars display a pattern of choices consistent with the guilt aversion model introduced in section 3.1.
We observe 33% of such players in R1, 25% in R3, and 44% in R5.
To check whether the pattern described can be generated by a random process, we perform a Monte-
Carlo simulation with 5,000 replications of random samples of conditional back transfers obtained by
bootstrapping the original sample. In R1, on average, the share of participants with a positive and
significant correlation between conditional back transfers and beliefs in random samples is 0.77% with a
standard deviation of 0.26. None of the replications produce a sample with more than 22% of the players
with significant correlation. In R3, we observe an average share of 1.57% (sd=0.92), and a maximum
share of 11%. In R5, the average share is 4.45% (sd=1.64) and the maximum is 16%. The Monte-Carlo
simulation provides support to the hypothesis the pattern observed in the experiment is the result of a
systematic choice.
The regression analysis confirms the results of the correlation tests. Columns 1 to 3 of table 5 show
the result of regression (1) using di erent sets of control variables. In column 1, we control for transfer
received by the matched A-player, sex, age, number of siblings, risk aversion,19 and order of treatment.
In column 2, we additionally control for GASP and JPI-cooperativeness scales. In column 3, we also
include random e ects at the participant level. Since we normalize the conditional back transfer dividing
it by the transfer received by As, the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, we apply a two-limit
Tobit model.
In all the specifications, the coe cient of second order beliefs is positive and significant. On average,
a unit increase in second order belief generates a 3.7% increase in the dependent variable (i.e., proportion
of transfer given back). Adding the GASP and JPI-cooperativeness scales and the random e ects to
the regression does not change the significance of the coe cient and has little e ect on its dimension.
Also, the B-players tends to return proportionally less as the rate of return increases. The di erence is
18The minimum sample size to perform a statistically significant correlation is 4. The B-players receiving less than 3
pounds in R1 are thus excluded from the analysis. Sample size is 9 in R1, 55 in R3 and 63 in R5.
19We excluded 7 players from the sample due to inconsistencies in their answers to the Holt and Laury task. To calculate
risk aversion, we consider the first switching point and remove from the sample players that switched their answer more than
3 times.
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statistically significant between R1 and R3 and between R3 and R5 (Wald test on equality of coe cients
returns p-value<0.01 in the specification with random e ects). The result is consistent with previous
findings suggesting that the B-players take into account the ‘size of the pie’ by adjusting downwards their
back transfer (Johnson and Mislin, 2011).
Dependent var.: Tobit Regression
Conditional back transfer (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second order beliefs 0.0369*** 0.0365*** 0.0389*** 0.2004*** 0.1975*** 0.2035***
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0034) (0.0298) (0.0277) (0.0267)
R3 -0.0795* -0.0711 -0.0799** 0.2463*** 0.2506** 0.2359***
(0.0448) (0.0510) (0.0356) (0.0935) (0.1079) (0.0742)
R5 -0.1472*** -0.1549*** -0.1572*** 0.2349*** 0.2217** 0.2384***
(0.0428) (0.0599) (0.0447) (0.0870) (0.0991) (0.0763)
Second order beliefs x R3 -0.1567*** -0.1546*** -0.1543***
(0.0368) (0.0358) (0.0277)
Second order beliefs x R5 -0.1683*** -0.1658*** -0.1700***
(0.0312) (0.0297) (0.0269)
RE at participant level Yes Yes
Psychological scales Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 954 954 954 954 954 954
Number of groups 65 65 65 65 65 65
Table 5: The excluded category for the indicator variable are R1 and second order beliefs x R1. Controls include:
transfer received by A, sex, age, number of siblings, risk aversion, and order of treatment. Psychological scales:
GASP and JPI-cooperativeness. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 7 refers to the within-subject regression analysis and shows the distribution of statistically
significant (at least at 5% level) coe cients from regressing conditional back transfers on second order
beliefs for each B-player in the three treatments. Each bar in the graph represents a participants. Across
the various treatments, more than 80% of the significant coe cients are positive suggesting that many
players behave according to the predictions of the guilt aversion model.
Result 1 - There is a systematic positive correlation between second order beliefs and conditional back
transfers, both at the aggregate and within-subject level. This result holds across the di erent incentive
schemes considered.
23
Figure 7: Distribution of coe cients, significant at least at
5% level, estimated in within-subject regressions of condi-
tional back transfers on second order beliefs by treatment.
Each bar represents one participant.
Figure 8: Distribution of coe cients estimated in within-
subject regressions of conditional back transfers on second
order beliefs fully interacted with treatment dummies. Each
couple of stacked bars represents one participant. Only par-
ticipants with at least one significant coe cient are repre-
sented.
4.2.2 Result 2 - Interaction between guilt aversion and the incentive scheme
In this section, we study how guilt aversion interacts with the incentive scheme. Table 5 - columns 4 to 6
- shows the result of regression (2). As in the previous section, the dependent variable is normalized over
the transfer received. We use a Tobit specification and adopt the same sets of control variables.
The coe cient of second order beliefs is positive and significant which implies that, on average, the
behavior of B-players is consistent with the prediction of the guilt aversion model in R1, after controlling
for covariates. Both the interaction terms of treatment with beliefs are negative and strongly significant.
The Wald test indicates that the coe cient for R3 interacted with beliefs is di erent from the interaction
with R5 (p-value=0.0547) in the specification including random e ect), but the e ect is only marginally
significant using the other specifications. The coe cients of the dummy variables R3 and R5 are positive
and significant indicating that the B-players return proportionally more as the rate of return increases,
once controlling for guilt aversion.
We performed a within-subject analysis where we regress conditional back transfer (normalized as
in the aggregate analysis) on second order beliefs, indicator variables for treatment, and interaction
between the two terms controlling for the transfer received. The analysis considers only the B-players
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that received a positive transfer in all treatments (32 participants). For 60% of them no interaction term is
significantly di erent from 0). For the remaining participants, there is at least one interaction term which
is significantly di erent from 0.20 Figure 8 displays the coe cients of the interaction term resulting from
the within-subject regression for those participants. The vast majority of the coe cients - 85% - are
negative.
Result 2 - On average the coe cient of the interaction term between second order beliefs and treatment
decreases with the rate of return. The e ect is strong when the rate of return increases from 1 to 3 and
much weaker when the increase is from 3 to 5. There is individual heterogeneity in the sample. For 60%
of the players, no interaction term is significantly di erent from 0; among the other 40%, there is a strong
prevalence of players for which both interaction terms are significantly smaller than 0.
4.2.3 Result 3 - Guilt aversion and personality traits
Table 6 shows the result of regression (3). We use two definitions of guilt aversion, as anticipated in
section 4.2.3. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is an individual level dummy variable which
assumes value 1 whenever a player is guilt averse across all the incentive schemes, 0 otherwise.21 We
use a probit specification and the table reports the marginal e ects at mean values of the independent
variables. In columns 3 and 4, we use the average of the correlation coe cients between conditional
back transfers and second order beliefs across the three treatments. The small set of control includes risk
aversion, age, sex, number of siblings, average back-transfer, and average of first order beliefs. The large
set of controls additionally includes GASP and JPI-cooperativeness scales. In all the regressions standard
errors are clustered at the session level.
2070% of such regressions have both coe cients statistically significant.
21Following the notation introduced in the previous section, guilt aversion corresponds to a Spearman correlation coe cient
that is positive and significant at least at 5% level.
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Dependent variable: Probit OLS
Guilt aversion (1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness to experience -0.0311*** -0.0345*** -0.0298** -0.0281**
(0.0105) (0.0128) (0.0087) (0.0100)
Conscientiousness 0.0083 0.0049 0.0121 0.0121
(0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0120) (0.0122)
Extraversion -0.0076 -0.0062 0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0065) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0058)
Agreeableness 0.0078 0.0011 -0.0097 -0.0122
(0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0098) (0.0094)
Neuroticism 0.0189** 0.0201*** 0.0147 0.0122
(0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0135) (0.0164)
Psychological scales Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 65 65 65 65
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.3028 0.3939 0.2051 0.2164
Log-likelihood -23.6103 -20.5263
Table 6: Columns 1 and 2 report marginal e ects at the mean of the independent variables.
Controls include: risk aversion, age, number of siblings, average back-transfer, and average
of first order beliefs. Psychological scales: GASP and JPI-cooperativeness. Standard errors
clustered at session level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Only one personality factor is robustly significant throughout all the specifications. The higher a
participant scores in openness to experience the less likely he is to display a positive correlation between
second order beliefs and conditional back transfers. Using the discrete definition of guilt aversion an
increase of 1 point in the openness to experience scale generates 3 to 4% decrease in the likelihood of
being guilt averse at mean values of the independent variables. Using the continuous definition (i.e.,
average correlation) the e ect is slightly smaller but still significant. Baumeister et al. (1994) say that
‘combining empathic distress and exclusion anxiety furnishes a potentially powerful basis for analyzing
guilt and predicting its patterns of occurrence.’ Openness to experience positively correlates with good
relationship satisfaction (McCrae and Sutin, 2009), and the sign of the coe cient seems to support the
hypothesis that less socially included individuals are more prone to experience guilt.
Consistently with the psychological literature, the participants who score high on neuroticism are
more likely than average to experience guilt (Boyle et al., 2008), and indeed, they are more likely to be
display a behavior consistent with the predication of the guilt aversion model. The coe cient, however,
is statistically significant only using the discrete definition of guilt aversion suggesting that more neurotic
participants are more likely to be ‘unconditionally’ guilt averse, but there is no significant e ect on the
average degree of guilt aversion. The coe cients of the other personality traits are not significant.
26
The results of the regressions in table 5 do not vary significantly after the inclusion of GASP and
JPI-cooperativeness scales as controls (columns 2 and 4). This outcome, together with the results of the
regressions in the previous sections, seems to suggest that the definition of guilt aversion adopted in the
economic literature is capturing something di erent from the emotional trait of guilt proneness captured
by surveys typically used in psychology.22
Result 3 - Participants scoring high in openness to experience are significantly less likely to display a
positive correlation between second order beliefs and conditional back transfers. Neurotic participants
are more likely to display such positive correlation, but only when it does not depend on the incentive
scheme.
5 Conclusion
An increasing amount of empirical studies suggests that in many strategic interactions, people’s preferences
depend on what others expect from them. Aversion to guilt seems to drive some individuals to reciprocate
trust when they are expected to do so. The data presented in this paper are consistent with the guilt
aversion hypothesis and suggest that purely outcome-based motives, such as altruism or fairness, are
insu cient to explain players’ behaviors in the investment game.
My study o ers an analysis of two potential sources of heterogeneity that have received little or
no attention in the literature - incentive schemes and personality traits. The data reveal significant
heterogeneity in the way people trade-o  guilt and incentives. Guilt aversion - as measured by the
correlation between second order beliefs and choices - depends on the rate of return for a significant
proportion of participants, and, on average, guilt aversion decreases as the stakes in the game become
higher. The results of the experiment also suggest that guilt aversion is negatively correlated to openness
to experience and positively to neuroticism.
22Bellemare et al. (2019) find a positive correlation between guilt aversion measured within a framework of psychological
games and guilt aversion measured using a slightly modified version of TOSCA-3 (Tangney et al., 2000). In the present
experiment, such a correlation is not present. However, the possibility to compare the present results with Bellemare et al.
(2019) is limited by the fact that the surveys and experimental design used in the two studies are di erent.
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This paper contributes to unveiling the contextual and individual factors that influence guilt aversion.
The analysis suggests that guilt aversion is highly heterogeneous and sensitive to both the experimental
context and individual characteristics such as personality traits. How these results generalize to other
strategic interactions is left for future research.
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A Appendix: Decision stage of B-player
Figure A1: Player B (receiving 6 pounds), treatment R3
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Figure A2: Player B (receiving 9 pounds), treatment R3
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B Appendix: Guilt proneness scale
Instructions: In this questionnaire you will read about situations that people are likely to encounter in
day-to-day life, followed by common reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, try to
imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate the likelihood that you would react in the way described.
1. After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because the
salesclerk doesn’t notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable about keeping
the money?
2. You are privately informed that you are the only one in your group that did not receive the mention
of honor because you skipped too many days of school.1 What is the likelihood that this would lead
you to become more responsible about attending school?
3. You reveal a friend’s secret, though your friend never finds out. What is the likelihood that your
failure to keep the secret would lead you to exert extra e ort to keep secrets in the future?
4. You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse about breaking
the law?
5. You strongly defend a point of view in a discussion, and though nobody was aware of it, you realize
that you were wrong. What is the likelihood that this would make you think more carefully before
you speak?
6. At a coworker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream-colored carpet. You
cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. What is the likelihood that you would
feel that the way you acted was pathetic?
7. While discussing a heated subject with friends, you suddenly realize you are shouting though
nobody seems to notice. What is the likelihood that you would try to act more considerately toward
your friends?
8. You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel terrible
about the lies you told?
1The original sentence was ‘You are the only one in your group that did not make the honor society’. We slightly changed
the choice of words in the scenario to make the situation more appropriate for an English student-based subject pool.
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The answers are given on a 7-point Likert scale (1 Very Unlikely - 7 Very Likely).
The GASP is scored by averaging the 4 items in each subscale (Guilt-NBE: 1, 4, 6, 8; Guilt repair: 2, 3,
5, 7).
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C Appendix: Experimental instructions
GENERAL INFORMATION
Welcome! You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. If you follow the instructions
carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money depending on your decisions. This set of
instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with
anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand. Then, we will come to your seat and answer your
questions. Any violation of this rule excludes you immediately from the experiment and all payments.
For your participation you will receive a show-up fee of 4 pounds. You can earn additional amounts of
money. Below we describe how.
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
The experiment is composed of 3 phases: 2 involve the participation in games and the other one consists
in surveys. First, you will complete the surveys. Then, you will take part in GAME 1. Lastly, you will
participate in GAME 2.
PHASE 1 - SURVEY
You will take part in 3 surveys. On the screen you will find the instructions on how to answer the questions
in each of the survey. If you complete all the questionnaires you will receive a payment of 4 pounds.
PHASE 2 - GAME 1
There are two players: Player A and Player B. You will be randomly selected to play as Player A or B and
you will play in the same role during the entire experiment.
Player A decision. Player A is endowed with 4 pounds and has to decide an amount she/he wants to
transfer to Player B. Player A can choose any integer between 0 and 4 pounds. Player B receives this
amount multiplied by a rate of return R. The game is played three times, each time with a di erent rate of
return: R = 1, 3 or 5. At each new round of the game you will face a di erent Player B. For example, if
Player A decides to give 2 pounds to Player B:
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• When the rate of return is 1, Player B receives: 2 x 1 = 2 pounds
• When the rate of return is 3, Player B receives: 2 x 3 = 6 pounds
• When the rate of return is 5, Player B receives: 2 x 5 = 10 pounds
Note: if Player A decides to transfer nothing, Player B gets nothing with any rate of return.
Player B decision. After receiving the money, Player B has to decide an amount to give back to Player
A. Player B can choose any integer amount between 0 and the amount received. Recall that the game is
played three times, each time with a di erent rate of return: R = 1, 3 or 5. At each new round of the game
you will face a di erent Player A.
Payo s GAME 1. The payo s are calculated as follows:
• Payo  of Player A = 4 pounds-Amount transferred to Player B + Amount Player B gives back
• Payo  of Player B = Amount received from Player A x Rate of return - Amount given back to A
Your guesses. Before starting the game, you are also asked to report your beliefs regarding the other
players’ decision. If your guess is accurate you will receive rewards (details about the amounts and how
the accuracy is computed will appear on your screen). Please note that ALL THE GUESSES will be
rewarded, regardless of the rate of return.
PHASE 3 - GAME 2
A new instruction sheet will be provided upon termination of the previous two phases.
CONFIDENTIALITY
All your decisions will be treated confidentially both during the experiment and after the experiment.
This means that none of the other participants nor the researcher will ever know the decisions you made.
PAYMENT
At the end of the experiment, one of the payo s from the three rounds of GAME 1 will be randomly
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selected and paid together with the rewards for the correct guesses, the payo  from GAME 2, the payment
for completing the surveys and the show-up fee. Please remain seated after you finish the experiment.
We will come to your desk with an envelope containing the money you earned. Don’t forget to check the











We study how matching a ects confidence. Our lab experiment allows us to identify the e ect of being
matched with others of either similar or dissimilar performance (assortative or disassortative matching) on
people’s confidence in their own ability. Across a variety of tasks we find that assortative matching does not
have a substantial nor statistically significant e ect on confidence compared to a control group with random
matching. By contrast, disassortative matching has a negative e ect on confidence on average that is driven
by the bottom half of performers. This group becomes substantially less confident compared to random
matching. We discuss potential mechanisms and implications of this result.
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1 Introduction
A crucial aspect of institutional design, relevant for workplace organization, schools and the higher
educations sector alike, is how to match people to achieve the best outcomes. Outcomes that have
received a lot of attention in the literature include the academic performance of students (Sacerdote, 2001;
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006; Feld and Zoelitz, 2017), the performance of workers and work teams
(Mas and Moretti, 2009; Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010) as well as cooperation
and pro-social behaviour in groups (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Grimm and Mengel, 2009; Branas-
Garza et al., 2010; Currarini and Mengel, 2016). One outcome that has received much less attention in
this context is confidence. This is despite the fact that confidence has been shown to be an important
outcome explaining gender di erences in competitiveness and leadership among young adults (Alan and
Ertac, 2019; Alan et al., 2020), intergenerational income mobility (Blanden et al., 2007) and academic
performance of students (Golsteyn et al., 2019) among other things.1
In this paper we focus on how matching a ects confidence. We design a lab experiment that allows us
to identify the e ect of being matched with others of either similar or dissimilar performance (assortative
or disassortative matching) on people’s confidence in their own ability. Across a variety of tasks we
find that assortative matching does not have a substantial nor statistically significant e ect on confidence
compared to a control group with random matching. By contrast, disassortative matching has a negative
e ect on confidence on average that is driven by the bottom half of performers. This group becomes
substantially less confident compared to random matching. However they become also more accurate, i.e.
less overconfident, with disassortative compared to random matching. We also find that participants react
more strongly to negative than to positive feedback on average, but there is some heterogeneity across
tasks with this finding.
These results are relevant for educational tracking within schools, matching students across schools,
matching workers in teams and the selection of peers more generally (Golsteyn et al., 2019). They are
particularly relevant in contexts, such as education, where confidence is considered an important outcome
(Ytterberg et al., 1998; Anderson et al., 2012). To the extent that our results have external validity in the
1Heckman et al. (2006) highlight the importance of non-cognitive skills more generally.
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specific domain considered, they suggest actionable consequences for institutional design.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 contains details of
our experimental design. Section 4 contains our main results and Section 5 concludes. A series of Online
Appendices contain experimental instructions, screenshots and additional tables and figures.
2 Literature
Our paper contributes to two so far largely disjoint strands of literature. First we contribute to an active
literature on how matching a ects a variety of di erent outcomes (usually not including confidence).
Second we contribute to literature aimed at understanding the various ways in which (over-) confident
beliefs arise in a dynamic setting.
There is a substantial literature on how matching a ects outcomes including academic performance of
students (Sacerdote, 2001; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006; Feld and Zoelitz, 2017), the performance of
workers and work teams (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010)
as well as cooperation and pro-social behaviour in groups (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Grimm and
Mengel, 2009; Branas-Garza et al., 2010; Currarini and Mengel, 2016). Apart from the di erent outcomes
studied, this literature also di ers by whether matching is exogenous or endogenous and it includes a large
literature on peer e ects. Our paper is more closely related to papers where matching, as in our case,
is exogenous. Those include Feld and Zoelitz (2017) who show that university student’s performance
depends on the performance of other students in their class in a non-monotonic way or Mas and Moretti
(2009) who show that the productivity of supermarket cashiers depends on which other cashiers work
on the same shift. Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) show that early educational tracking in schools
increases inequality. Their analysis also suggests that early tracking might reduce mean performance.2
Sacerdote (2014) reviews some of the large literature on peer e ects.
Our main contribution to this literature is to consider confidence as a key outcome variable. There
are only very few papers on matching that include confidence as an outcome. Those can mostly be
2Tracking usually includes assortative matching, but also a variety of other measures (di ering teaching materials etc).
Hence, studying the e ect of tracking does not usually identify the pure e ect of matching.
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found in the peer e ects literature (see for example Antonio, 2004). These papers di er from ours in
that they consider the influence of endogenously selected friendship groups as opposed to assortative or
disassortative matching based on performance.
Our paper also contributes to literature aimed at understanding the various ways in which (over-)
confident beliefs come about. In standard economic models, beliefs matter only through their instrumental
value in decision making. Recent theoretical work has relaxed this assumption and assumed that people
could gain direct utility by holding optimistic beliefs on qualities that are relevant for the self (Köszegi,
2006). When beliefs entail a direct utility, belief updating can depart from the Bayesian benchmark
towards optimistic updating in a self-serving way.
There is a growing experimental literature on asymmetric updating, and the results are mixed. Mobius
et al. (2011) and Möbius et al. (2007) find that subjects who receive positive feedback in an IQ test revise
their beliefs significantly more than those who receive negative feedback. Eil and Rao (2011) also find
that subjects asymmetrically update their beliefs on intelligence, and physical attractiveness. They adhere
quite closely to the Bayesian benchmark in case of positive signals, but they discount or ignore the signal
when it is negative. In Zimmermann (2019), subjects perform an IQ test and receive feedback. He finds
little evidence for asymmetry in the short run, but subjects recall negative feedback with lower accuracy
one month after receiving the feedback. Sharot et al. (2011) find that subjects updated their beliefs more
in response to information that was better than expected than to information that was worse than expected.
Other authors find evidence of asymmetric updating in the opposite direction - negative signals weighted
more than positive ones. Ertac (2011) studies belief updating across tasks with di erent degrees of
self-relevance. The results of her study indicate that subjects attribute more weight to negative signals
than positive ones in the self-relevant context but not in the neutral one. Coutts (2019) also examines
whether updating di ers across ego-relevant and neutral contexts. His results show that negative signals
receive more weight than positive ones but these deviations do not di er across contexts. Our main
contribution to this literature is to study how matching a ects belief updating and in particular confidence
and accuracy of beliefs across tasks with di erent degrees of ego-relevance and prior strength.
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3 Design
In this section we describe the experimental design and procedures. Our experiment consists of a 3 ⇥ 3
design where we vary the type of task and the type of matching. In all treatments participants go through
the following stages: introduction, experimental task and belief updating. We will describe these stages
in turn.
Introduction stage In this stage, we show participants information about the task they will be asked to
complete in the next stage, and describe how their earnings from the task stage are going to be calculated.
At the end of this introduction, participants are asked to answer two questions regarding their prior beliefs.
In particular, they are asked to state (i) what they believe the average score is going to be in that session
and (ii) where they believe they rank among the participants of that session.3
Task stage In the task stage, participants perform either one of the following tasks (i) observing pairs
of contemporary paintings on the screen and guessing which painting received a higher price at an auction
(ART), (ii) solving the Raven matrices task (IQ) or (iii) observing a pair of footballers on the screen
and guessing which one of them scored more goals during a specified season (FOOT). We now describe
details of each task.
The ART task consists in comparing pairs of paintings sold at a real auction.4 The pictures of the
paintings, the title of the work of art, and the author appear on the computer screen and participants are
asked to indicate which painting was sold at the higher price. The task involves the comparison of 15
di erent pairs of paintings. The score is calculated as the total number of correct answers across the 15
pairs.
The IQ task consists in Raven’s progressive matrices task, which is a 60-item test used in measuring
abstract reasoning and regarded as a non-verbal estimate of fluid intelligence. For this task, one of the
test questions is used as an example during the Introduction stage, and the task involves the 59 remaining
questions. All of the questions on the Raven’s test consist of visual geometric design with a missing piece.
3Each experimental session had 16 participants.
4Impressionist & Modern Art Evening Sale conducted by Christie’s London on February 2, 2016.
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The test taker is given six to eight choices to pick from and fill in the missing piece. Participants have 10
minutes to complete as many questions as they can. The score is calculated as the total number of correct
answers given within the time limit.
The FOOT task consists in comparing the number of goals scored by two football players of the
Turkish Super League. The pictures of the players, and the team they played in the season 2017-2018
appear on the computer screen and participants are asked to indicate which player scored more goals in
that season. The task involves the comparison of 15 di erent pairs of players. The score is calculated as
the total number of correct answers across the 15 pairs.
The di erent tasks were chosen to be able to detect if main results were driven by task-specific
properties. They primarily present variation along two dimensions: (i) ego-relevance (Ertac, 2011;
Coutts, 2019) and (ii) the strength of the prior about one’s rank. Our assumption is that - on average -
ART has both low ego-relevance and a weak prior. IQ has high ego-relevance and a strong prior and
FOOT has high ego-relevance for some, and low for others and a strong prior for both groups.
Belief revision stage In the belief revision stage, participants are first shown their score and then asked
a series of questions regarding their rank among the 16 participants in a session. Here, participants
observe 8 subgroups (rank 1 or 2, rank 3 or 4,...rank 15 or 16) and for each subgroup, they specify the
probability that their actual rank falls in that subgroup. In Step 2, participants receive information on the
score of another participant from the session; in the assortative matching condition (Assortative), the score
is that of a participant who is ranked similarly to them. Specifically participants with rank 1-8 are shown
the score of participant ranked +1 (1 observes 2, 2 observes 3, ... , 8 observes 9) while participants with
rank 9-16 are shown the score of participant ranked -1 (9 observes 8, 10 observes 9, ... , 16 observes 15).
In the disassortative matching treatment (Disassortative), the score is that of a participant who is ranked
di erently to them. Specifically, participants ranked 1 to 8 are shown the score of participant ranked 16
and participants ranked 9 to 16 observe the participant ranked first. In the random condition (Random),
they are shown the score of a randomly selected participant. Participants are then asked to state their
beliefs regarding their ranking, by specifying the probabilities for 8 subgroups as in the previous step.
In subsequent steps, we disclose pieces of information while keeping track of how participants update
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their beliefs on their ranking. In Step 3 we reveal to each participant in which half of the distribution
they performed and we ask them to guess in which one of the four remaining subgroups they think they
performed. In Step 4 we reveal in which quarter of the score distribution they rank and we ask to guess
in which of the two subgroups of that specific quarter they think they performed. Finally (Step 5), we tell
participants in which subgroup they performed, and we ask them to guess their exact ranking. After this




Random (C) 64 64 64
Assortative (AT) 64 64 64
Disassortative (DAT) 63 64 64
Table 1: Number of observations. One participant had to be dropped
in ART-DAT as he had already participated in a prior session.
Payments The experiment is incentivized based on the performance in the Task stage and the accuracy
of one of the guesses in the Belief revision stage. For the Task stage, participants are paid 1 TL for
each correct answer in the ART task, 0.5 TL for each correct answer in the IQ task and 2 TL for each
correct answer in the FOOT task.5 For the Belief revision stage, one of the 5 steps where participants
stated their beliefs was randomly selected and participants were paid based on their accuracy for this
step. In particular, we used a logarithmic rule and the earnings are calculated according to the formula
32 + 32 log(p). Here, p is the number we find by dividing the probability that the participant assigns to
the subgroup that contains her actual ranking. Since p 2 [0, 1], log(p) is a zero or negative number, the
earnings here could be at most 32 TL from this part.6 While novel, the scoring rule we used here is a
proper scoring rule, that is, it incentivizes the participants to state their true beliefs. To see this, suppose
there are two categories, high & low, and the participant’s belief that her rank is high is b. When her
reported belief is p, her expected payo  becomes 32(1 + blog(p) + (1   b)log(1   p)). Given b, this is
5We chose to pay a lower amount for each correct answer in the IQ task due to higher number of questions in that task. On
the other hand, the FOOT task pays a relatively higher amount because these sessions were conducted later and a there was a
substantial drop in the value of Turkish Lira during the six month period between the first and last session.
6If the participant stated a belief of p  0.1 for the subgroup where her rank is, then her earnings were rounded to 0. This
was mainly to prevent negative earnings from this stage and was specified in the instructions, as well.
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a concave function of p and the first order conditions for maximization implies (1   p)b + p(1   b) = 0,
hence p = b. The rule and payo  consequences were explained in detail in the Experimental Instructions
(see Appendix B).
Questionnaire At the end of the experiment, participants are asked to complete a post-experimental
questionnaire eliciting a number of demographics as well as measures of risk attitude and trust. The full
list of questions can be found in Appendix C.
Other Details The experiment was conducted at the experimental lab at Bogazici University between
November 2018 (ART task) and May 2019 (FOOT task). 575 students participated in our experiment
(64 per treatment).7 Ethical approval was obtained in March 2018 by the Faculty Ethics Committee of
the University of Essex (under Annex B). The experiment was programmed using the software z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) and we used ORSEE to recruit subjects (Greiner, 2004).
4 Main Results
In this section we present our main results. We ask how matching a ects confidence (Section 4.1), the
accuracy of guesses (Section 4.2) and when it leads to a ects over- or under-confidence (Section 4.3).
Section 4.4 is dedicated to studying the dynamics of confidence over time and in Section 4.5 we discuss
potential mechanisms.
4.1 Confidence
The left panel of Table 2 shows participants’ average guessed rank after treatment, i.e. after they observed
the score of their match. The figure shows that in all treatments participants are on average somewhat
overconfident. The average guessed rank is below the actual mean of 8.5. People seem more confident
in their ability in terms of the IQ and FOOT tasks compared to the ART task. It should also be noted,
7One participant had to be dropped ex post as it was found out that he had participated twice in the experiment.
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though, that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in these guesses as illustrated by Appendix
Figure E2.
Assortative Random Disassortative Assortative Random Disassortative
ART 8.12 8.26 8.90 ART 1.68 1.54 1.23
IQ 6.38 6.74 7.00 IQ 1.76 1.86 1.59
FOOT 7.01 6.62 7.64 FOOT 1.56 1.60 1.54
Guessed Rank. Absolute Error.
Table 2: Left: Average guessed rank after treatment (i.e., step 2 of the belief revision stage). Right: Absolute Errors
(absolute di erence between guessed and actual rank after treatment).
Guessed Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire Sample Rank< 9 Rank  8
Assortative -0.183 -0.198 -0.121 -0.122 -0.117 -0.105
(0.383) (0.377) (0.433) (0.413) (0.417) (0.430)
Disassortative 0.560 0.560 -0.049 -0.057 1.277** 1.289**
(0.424) (0.414) (0.423) (0.428) (0.477) (0.476)
Constant 10.26** 10.67*** 8.632*** 9.251*** 8.663*** 8.667***
(1.194) (1.241) (1.587) (1.809) (1.569) (1.558)
Controls YES YES+ YES YES+ YES YES+
Observations 575 575 287 287 288 288
R-squared 0.086 0.099 0.130 0.152 0.079 0.080
Table 3: OLS regression of Guessed Rank at step 2 of the belief revision stage on treatment dummies. The small
set of controls includes age, gender, whether the participant lives with their parents and whether they have siblings.
The large set additionally controls for measures of risk aversion and trust, whether they are economics students and
linearly for how many friends they have. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To understand how confidence is a ected by matching we compare our di erent treatments. Table 3
shows regression results showing how confidence is a ected by the treatment at step 2 of the belief revision
stage. For the entire sample (columns (1) and (2)) we do not see a statistically significant average treatment
e ect. While on average confidence tends to increase in the Assortative treatments (i.e. the guessed rank
decreases) and decrease in the Disassortative treatments (i.e. the guessed rank increases), both of these
e ects are very imprecisely estimated. More interesting is how matching a ects confidence di erentially
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for those in the upper and lower half of the distribution. For those with a good (i.e. low) rank (columns
(3) and (4)) the e ect of matching on their guessed rank is close to zero and statistically insignificant. By
contrast those with a high rank (columns (5) and (6)) su er a substantial decrease in confidence (of more
than one position) in Disassortative compared to the control condition. Disassortative matching hence
seems to have a strong e ect on those in bottom half of distribution. Their confidence is, as expected,
lowered. The e ect persists after receiving one more piece of information about one’s rank but disappears
after further pieces of information are revealed (Appendix Table D1).
Figure 1: Di erence between average rank guess in Assorta-
tive treatments (light gray bars) and control as well as between
Disassortative treatments (dark gray bars) and control depending
on participant’s rank (1-16) at step 2 of the belief revision stage.
Positive numbers indicate that participants are less confident than
in the control (i.e. indicate a bigger rank) and negative numbers
that they are more confident (i.e. indicate a smaller rank).
Heterogeneity Figure 1 shows this e ect across the distribution of ranks. The figure shows that
Disassortative matching almost never leads to substantial increases in confidence across this distribution,
while in Assortative confidence tends to increase for those in the bottom half of the distribution. These
treatment e ects do not di er substantially neither by task nor gender (Appendix Tables D2 and D3).
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4.2 Accuracy
We have seen that worse-performing participants become less confident with disassortative matching, but
do they become more accurate? The right panel of Figure 1 shows averages of the variable “absolute
error” defined as the absolute di erence between the guessed and the actual rank of a participant. The
panel shows that participants guesses are fairly accurate on average. In the control group participants
guesses di er on average between 1.5 to 1.8 ranks (depending on the task) from their true rank. They
seem to make somewhat smaller errors under Disassortative matching while there doesn’t seem to be a
consistent di erence between the control group and the Assortative treatment.
Absolute Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire Sample Rank< 9 Rank> 8
Assortative -0.020 -0.024 0.015 0.013 -0.039 -0.038
(0.091) (0.093) (0.105) (0.095) (0.201) (0.208)
Disassortative -0.241** -0.238** 0.144 0.143 -0.602*** -0.595***
(0.098) (0.105) (0.097) (0.085) (0.197) (0.208)
Constant 2.308*** 2.367*** 1.345** 1.158* 2.157** 2.199**
(0.733) (0.728) (0.609) (0.604) (0.904) (0.945)
Controls YES YES+ YES YES+ YES YES+
Observations 575 575 287 287 288 288
R-squared 0.014 0.029 0.033 0.063 0.061 0.068
Table 4: OLS regression of absolute error (absolute di erence between guessed and actual rank) at step 2 of the
belief revision task on treatment dummies. The small set of controls includes age, gender, whether the participant
lives with their parents and whether they have siblings. The large set additionally controls for measures of risk
aversion and trust, whether they are economics students and linearly for how many friends they have. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 shows regression results using absolute error as endogenous variable. The table shows that
there is virtually no di erence between the Assortative treatment and the control group neither for the high,
nor for the low performers. In the Disassortative treatment by contrast participants make substantially
smaller errors (by around 10%), i.e. the di erence between guessed and actual ranks is smaller in this
treatment. The table shows that this e ect is driven by those with lower performance (columns (5)-(6))
for whom we observe an about 27% decrease compared to the control group.
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Heterogeneity Splitting the sample by task reveals that the e ect is driven by participants in the ART
and IQ tasks (Appendix Table D6) with the e ect size being substantially smaller in the FOOT task (F-test,
p = 0.067). Worse performing women become more accurate in the Disassortative treatment (compared
to men), while well performing men, but not women, become less accurate in this treatment (Appendix
Table D5). Neither of these di erences is statistically significant, though (F-test, p > 0.197).
We have seen that worse performers do not only become less confident, but also more accurate in the
Disassortative treatments. This suggests that there was over-confidence in this group to start with. In the
next subsection we will study e ects on over- and under- confidence explicitly.
4.3 Over- or Under- confidence?
To study overconfidence we focus on two outcome variables: (i) the average amount by which participants
underestimate their rank and (ii) the share of participants who believe they are ranked better than they
actually are.
Table 5 shows results for the first measure. The table shows again that it is mostly the Disassorta-
tive treatment which has a significant treatment e ect. Again the e ect seems to operate mostly on the
worse performers who, as anticipated, become less overconfident.
Overconfidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire Sample Rank< 9 Rank> 8
Assortative -0.008 -0.013 0.017 0.008 0.036 0.039
(0.182) (0.190) (0.212) (0.212) (0.215) (0.223)
Disassortative -0.345* -0.346 0.008 0.001 -0.676*** -0.672**
(0.202) (0.208) (0.207) (0.209) (0.244) (0.255)
Constant 1.980** 2.057* -0.802 -0.916 2.442*** 2.418**
(0.973) (1.038) (0.916) (0.956) (0.879) (0.937)
Controls YES YES+ YES YES+ YES YES+
Observations 575 575 287 287 288 288
R-squared 0.015 0.025 0.052 0.064 0.068 0.074
Table 5: OLS regression of overconfidence (di erence between actual and guessed rank) at step 2 of the belief
revision stage on treatment dummies. The small set of controls includes age, gender, whether the participant lives
with their parents and whether they have siblings. The large set additionally controls for measures of risk aversion
and trust, whether they are economics students and linearly for how many friends they have. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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We then turn our attention to the share of participants who believe they are ranked better than they
actually are, i.e. the share of overconfident participants. Table 6 shows regressions where the endogenous
variable is a dummy indicating whether a participant is overconfident. In line with the previous results we
find that the share of overconfident participants decreases in the Disassortative treatment in the group of
the worse performers. With this measure we also see for the first time an e ect of the Assortative treatment.
Among the worse performers the share of overconfident participants increases in this case. The e ect
size, however, is smaller (about half of the e ect size of the Disassortative treatment).
Overconfidence Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire Sample Rank< 9 Rank> 8
Assortative -0.010 -0.013 -0.059 -0.064 0.060** 0.060**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.059) (0.060) (0.026) (0.027)
Disassortative -0.048 -0.049 0.024 0.020 -0.109** -0.112**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.065) (0.065) (0.053) (0.055)
Constant 0.748** 0.724** 0.173 0.141 0.820*** 0.746***
(0.308) (0.318) (0.408) (0.416) (0.200) (0.221)
Controls YES YES+ YES YES+ YES YES+
Observations 575 575 287 287 288 288
R-squared 0.010 0.024 0.020 0.036 0.069 0.080
Table 6: OLS regression of dummy indicating whether a participant is overconfident on treatment dummies at step
2 of the belief revision stage. The small set of controls includes age, gender, whether the participant lives with
their parents and whether they have siblings. The large set additionally controls for measures of risk aversion and
trust, whether they are economics students and linearly for how many friends they have. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To summarize, matching seems to predominantly a ect worse performers. Disassortative matching
reduces their confidence and the share of overconfident participants in this group and, as a consequence,
makes their perceptions of their own rank more accurate. Assortative matching slightly increases the share
of overconfident participants in this group. Whenever we see a treatment e ect the direction of e ect is in
line with what we would expect from rational (Bayesian) learning. What is somewhat puzzling, though, is
why it is predominantly the Disassortative treatment that a ects learning and why assortative matching
does not seem to di er much from random matching in terms of its e ects on beliefs. Section 4.5 will
focus on the mechanisms behind our results to shed some light on these questions. Before we do so, we
study in some more detail the dynamics of belief revision across the di erent steps of our experiment.
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4.4 Dynamics
The feedback provided in our experiment during the di erent steps of the belief revision task is highly
diversified across participants, due to di erences in their scores, their own ranking in the main task and
the scores of other participants in their session. In this section, we introduce a normalized measure of
confidence for the di erent steps of the belief revision task. This will allow us to compare the di erent
steps of the revision process and study its dynamics. We start by noting that during all instances where
beliefs are elicited, participants specified beliefs for an even number categories. Based on the construction
used in Zimmermann (2019), we define normalized confidence as the di erence between the probabilities
assigned to the upper and lower half of the ranks that these categories represent. For example, a participant
whose rank is 5, will learn at step 3 of the belief revision task, that her rank is somewhere between 1 to 8.
Here, she is also asked to specify her beliefs for being in one of the 4 subgroups (being ranked 1st or 2nd,
3rd or 4th, 5th or 6th and 7th or 8th). In this instance, normalized confidence is measured as probabilities
assigned to first two of these categories (being ranked 1st or 2nd or being ranked 3rd or 4th) minus the
probabilities assigned to last two categories (being ranked 5th or 6th or being ranked 7th or 8th). By
construction normalized confidence takes a value between -100 and 100 when beliefs are represented as
percentages. This measure allows us to compare confidence across the di erent steps of belief revision
in our experiment and to study its dynamics.
Next, using a regression analysis we set out to analyze the determinants of this confidence at di erent
stages of the belief elicitation process. Our results are presented in Table 7 where confidence is regressed
on a series of dummy variables. The analysis provides us with the following insights. In Step 1 of the
belief revision task, the participant observes only her own score, and not surprisingly this score has a
substantial and highly significant e ect on confidence, as those scoring lower than average (Score < mean
= 1) have lower normalized confidence levels. While not incentivized, participant’s prior on the average
score from the task and their prior about their own rank in the task also have significant and persistent
e ects on confidence. In particular, we observe higher normalized confidence for those who have lower
than average expectations for the average score in the associated task (Prior for average score < mean =
1), and lower confidence for those who have higher than average, i.e. worse, expectations for their ranking
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(Prior for personal rank >mean = 1). These e ects are also not surprising, since an expectation of a higher
average score among participants or a worse personal rank would both mitigate personal confidence.
Normalized Confidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Score < mean -46.67*** -36.36*** -34.08*** -2.184 3.838
(5.941) (7.387) (6.213) (4.312) (5.973)
Prior for average score < mean 15.18*** 17.89*** 16.62*** 13.92*** 9.141**
(5.244) (4.547) (3.485) (3.980) (3.581)
Prior for personal rank > mean -38.61*** -25.55*** -28.77*** -20.03*** -17.85***
(4.364) (4.116) (4.690) (4.207) (4.251)
IQ 41.66*** 38.41*** 30.72*** 15.53*** 9.386***
(6.073) (5.011) (4.717) (4.580) (3.324)
FOOT 13.97** 23.69*** 25.61*** 12.14*** 15.91***
(6.338) (4.725) (4.071) (4.334) (4.567)
Assortative -7.187 1.843 -18.61** -5.007
(6.578) (7.537) (6.893) (5.943)
Disassortative -2.913 7.593 -10.19 -14.43***
(7.191) (7.538) (6.922) (5.120)
Rank > 8 -28.87*** 68.01*** 14.82 4.009
(9.468) (7.078) (9.621) (9.983)
Assortative ⇥ Rank > 8 13.72 -3.507 16.00 11.06
(10.72) (11.76) (13.63) (10.22)
Disassortative ⇥ Rank > 8 -24.70** -30.52*** -8.032 10.50
(11.12) (11.06) (10.57) (9.729)
Constant 55.18*** 58.21*** 0.0482 19.36*** 11.72**
(5.721) (6.600) (6.984) (5.021) (5.039)
Observations 575 575 575 575 575
R-squared 0.329 0.414 0.215 0.097 0.079
Table 7: Normalized Confidence regressed on treatment and other dummies across the five steps of belief revision.
Standard errors clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Step 2 of the belief revision task, where participants learn the score of another participant, we
observe a significant negative e ect of Disassortative treatment for the participants ranked in the bottom
50% (Rank > 8) of the session, as evidenced by the coe cient for “Disassortative⇥ Rank > 8”. This
e ect is also significant and has the same sign and similar magnitude at Step 3 of the belief revision task,
but not at Steps 4 and 5. On the other hand, the coe cient for “Rank > 8” is positive and significant at
Step 3. This observation has an intuitive explanation. At this step, a participant learns whether she is
ranked in the bottom half or the upper half of the distribution. Upon learning this news, subjects with
moderate beliefs would assign higher weights to categories close to the middle of the overall distribution.
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This means subjects learning that they are in the lower 50 % would assign a higher belief to being at the
3rd quartile compared to being at the 4th quartile. On the other hand, subjects learning that they are in
the upper 50% would assign a higher belief to to being at the 2nd quartile compared to being at the 1st
quartile. These in turn would imply that normalized confidence at Step 3 would be higher for subjects
ranked at the bottom 50%. The nature of tasks also seem to a ect normalized confidence. In particular,
the coe cients for IQ and FOOT are both positive and significant. During the initial stages of belief
elicitation, normalized confidence seems to be highest in the IQ task compared to the FOOT and ART
task (0.43 vs. 0.64 and 0.63, respectively). As subjects move to the latter steps, the e ect sizes become
smaller and the coe cients for IQ task and FOOT become more similar. Overall, hence, these results
show again that matching has the strongest e ect for those in the bottom half of the distribution. They
also show that the e ect is strongest at Step 2, where the treatment takes place.
4.5 Mechanisms
In this section we dig deeper into our data to gain some insight into the behavioural mechanisms underlying
these patterns. Figure 2 shows by how much participants’ rank guess changes on average (at Step 2)
depending on the di erence between their score and the score of the participant they observe (their
match). The top left panel shows the entire sample. The figure shows that on average participants become
more pessimistic about their rank (i.e. increase their guess) if they have a lower score than their match
and become more optimistic (i.e. decrease their guess) if they have a higher score than their match. If
they have the same score they become more pessimistic. This figure masks a considerable amount of
heterogeneity across tasks. In the ART task (top right panel) and the IQ task (bottom left panel) the
pattern is as described above. It can also be seen that participants in these tasks react much more strongly
to negative feedback (having a lower score than the match) than to positive feedback. If we accept that
the IQ task carries more ego-relevance than the ART task, then we can conclude that ego-relevance is not
a crucial mechanism behind this, as both tasks show a very similar pattern. The FOOT task (bottom right
panel) shows a di erent pattern, though. Here participants seem to become slightly more confident after
feedback was received irrespective of whether feedback was positive or negative. This could be because
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participants have - on average - a more pessimistic prior in this task. For the remainder of this section we
will aggregate the three tasks.
Figure 2: Change in guessed rank depending on di erence between own and other participant’s score. Top left:
entire sample; Top right: ART task; Bottom left: IQ task; Bottom right: FOOT task.
Table 8 shows regression results where we regress the change in confidence on the observed score
di erence and an indicator for whether the di erence is positive. The table shows that the indicator matters
even when score di erence is included in the regression (columns (3)-(4)). There is a discontinuous jump
in participant’s reaction to feedback once it changes sign. Figure 3 illustrates the regression results (Panel
(b)) and also shows the raw data averages (Panel (a)). The figure illustrates that confidence changes not as
much for positive feedback as it does for negative feedback.8 It also illustrates the discontinuous change
at zero.
8Note that there is a level shift between panels (a) and (b) which is due to the inclusion of controls in Panel (b).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in Guessed Rank
 Score -1.907*** -0.919 -0.990
(0.400) (0.568) (0.735)
pos -0.866*** -0.572** -0.587***
(0.144) (0.210) (0.214)
 Score ⇥ pos 0.191
(1.047)
Constant 1.007 1.104 1.020 1.007
(0.944) (0.902) (0.926) (0.945)
Observations 576 576 576 576
R-squared 0.074 0.080 0.085 0.085
Table 8: Change in Guessed Rank at step 2 of the belief revision stage regressed
on depending on di erence between own and other participant’s score ( Score),
a dummy indicating whether this di erence is positive (pos) and the interaction
between the two. Linear controls included for age and number of siblings as well
as gender dummy, indicator for housing situation and task fixed e ects. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 3: Change in Guessed Rank at step 2 of the belief revision stage depending on the di erence between own
and other participant’s score and on whether that di erence is negative or positive. Gray line with diamond markers
show women, square markers men and the black line the entire sample. The left panel shows raw data averages and
the right panel predicted values from the regression in Table 8 including controls for age, gender, task, siblings and
housing situation.
As there is a large psychological literature on gender di erences in reacting to feedback and attribution,
which shows that (i) women tend to react more strongly to feedback (for a review see Roberts, 1991)9
and (ii) that women are more likely to blame their ability for their failures (see for instance Dweck et al.,
9Interestingly, there are also experimental papers which find that women tend to update their beliefs less strongly than
men in response to feedback (Mobius et al., 2011; Coutts, 2019; Buser et al., 2018; Albrecht et al., 2013). Some authors point
to gender di erences which depend on the valence - good or bad - of the feedback received. Ertac (2011) finds that women
that completed a verbal task interpret positive feedback more conservatively than men while no gender di erence is found for
negative feedback. Berlin and Dargnies (2016) show that women update more pessimistically than their male counterparts
after receiving negative feedback but not after positive feedback.
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1978; Dweck and Reppucci, 1973; Nicholls, 1975) we also split the figures by gender. The gray lines in
Figure 3 show the change in confidence after feedback separately for women and men. In our experiment,
women react more strongly to feedback, but only if it is positive feedback. The e ect is just outside of
statistical significance, though (p = 0.1016). There is no (statistically significant) gender di erence in
the reaction to negative feedback.
Overall these results show that the direction of feedback (positive vs negative) seems more important
than the extent, i.e. how di erent the score of the other person is from one’s own score. They also show
that people react more when feedback is negative. The latter fact can also explain why disassortative
matching has a stronger treatment e ect. While both assortative and disassortative matching have an
equal share of participants exposed to positive and negative feedback, they di er in how strongly negative
or positive the feedback is.10 The fact that participants - on average - react more strongly to negative
feedback means that treatment e ects will be stronger under disassortative matching.
5 Conclusion
We conducted a lab experiment to study how matching a ects confidence. Across a variety of tasks we
find that assortative matching does not have a substantial nor statistically significant e ect on confidence
compared to a control group with random matching. By contrast, disassortative matching has a negative
e ect on confidence on average that is driven by the bottom half of performers. This group becomes
substantially less confident compared to random matching. However they become also more accurate, i.e.
less overconfident, with disassortative compared to random matching.
These are important findings that should be taken into account when designing policies like tracking
in schools or matching peers at work. There are, however, also several caveats and open questions for
future research. One important question regards the trade-o  between overconfidence and accuracy. It
seems obvious that there are advantages to holding accurate beliefs, however some also argue that there
are benefits from being overconfident (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Anderson et al., 2012; Murphy
10Under assortative matching many participants also see the same score as their own, i.e. receive “neutral” or “weakly
positive” feedback.
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et al., 2015; Radzevick and Moore, 2011). In the school setting, inaccurate self-evaluations have been
found to undermine students’ learning and retention (Dunlosky and Rawson, 2012) and overconfidence
is believed to induce a student to allocate less time to study, resulting in poor exams grades (Bandura,
1993). However, other authors (Magnus and Peresetsky, 2018; Johnson and Fowler, 2011) find that
for most students overconfidence is advantageous, possibly because it increases ambition, morale, and
persistence. The positive e ects of overconfidence are also stressed in innovation research. Di erent
authors associate overconfidence with greater exploration and risk-taking (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011;
Bernardo and Welch, 2001) leading to positive outcome in terms of technological development. On the
other hand, the performance in simple productivity tasks has been found to benefit from a heterogeneous
group composition (Mas and Moretti, 2009). Hence, which level of (over-) confidence to target is not
immediately obvious and might depend on the setting. In the classroom context, improving accuracy
in self-evaluation through disassortative matching might be combined with interventions that support
motivation and ambition for the weakest members. In the corporate setting, group composition might
need to be adjusted according to the task to be performed. Furthermore we should remember that
confidence is only one outcome a ected by matching and obviously the e ect on other outcomes has to
be taken into account.
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We perform a balancing check for our treatments. We regress the observables collected in the post-
experimental questionnaire on treatment dummies. The systematic presence of significant coe cients in
the regression would reveal di erences in the pool of participants of Assortative and Disassortative treat-
ments compared to the random treatment.
We consider the following dependent variables: in column (1) age, in (2) gender (male = 1), in (3)
living arrangement of subject (0= dorm; 1= with family; 2= with friends; 3= alone), in (4) number
of siblings, (5) risk attitude measured by the question “How willing are you to take risks in general?”
(10=high; 1=low), (6) trust measured by the question “Would you say that most people can be trusted?”
(1=yes), (7) number of economics classes taken, (8) number of friends among participants in the session.
Table A1 presents the results of the balancing check. Only two coe cients are significant - Assorta-
tive when regressed on age and Disassortative when regressed on siblings - indicating that participants
do not systematically di er across treatments. The data support the hypothesis of random assignment to
treatments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep variable: Age Male Living Siblings Risk Trust Econ. Friends
Assortative -0.474*** -0.062 0.052 -0.042 -0.125 -0.005 -0.130 0.083
(0.159) (0.050) (0.010) (0.098) (0.195) (0.037) (0.149) (0.090)
Disassortative -0.252 -0.033 -0.021 0.180* -0.034 0.006 -0.046 0.108
(0.160) (0.050) (0.010) (0.098) (0.195) (0.037) (0.150) (0.090)
Observations 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575
R-squared 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003
Table A1: Balancing check. Regression of observables on treatment dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Appendix: Instructions
All participants within a treatment received the same instructions. We handed out written instructions at
the beginning of each session. In B.1 and B.2, we report written instructions and screenshots for the ART
task. For the FOOT and IQ task, the instructions were modified according to the specificity of each task.
We provide further details on the FOOT task in B.4. The original instructions were in Turkish. Here, we
provide the English translation.
B.1 Written instructions - ART task
General Information
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making. If you follow the instruc-
tions carefully, you can earn a significant amount of money based on your choices.
This instruction set is for your private use only. You cannot communicate with anyone during the exper-
iment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. Then we’ll come and answer your questions.
Violation of this rule requires that we immediately exclude you from the experiment.
With the decisions you will make in the experiment, you will earn a profit. Below, we will explain the
details of this. All your decisions will be handled confidentially, both during and after the experiment.
This means that none of the other participants will know the decisions you make.
Part 1:
In this first part of the experiment we ask you to answer the questions in a test. To perform the test, we
will show paintings sold in an auction in February 2016. In addition to the paintings, we present the name
of the painting and the painter. You will see something similar to the following images:
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Pablo Picasso, Mandoline Egon Schiele, Oesterreichisches Mäderl
We then ask you to specify which one of these two paintings was sold at a higher price in this auction. To
complete the task, you are asked to compare 15 di erent pairs of paintings. Your test score is calculated
as the total number of correct answers in 15 pairs.
The maximum score you can get is 15 (if all your answers are correct). The minimum score is 0 (if all
your answers are incorrect). You will earn 1 TL for each correct answer in this section.
Part 2:
We will rank the participants in this room based on your test scores in the previous section. If two
participants get the same score, their rankings will be random. In this part of the experiment you are
asked to answer some questions about the performance of the other participants in the experiment and the
comparison of your performance vs. others performances.
In this section, we’ll ask you questions about your beliefs regarding your ranking in the test. We’ll ask
you to do this a total of 5 times, and give you new information every time. As you know, there are 16
people in the experiment, and your rankings range from 1st to 16th.
Each time, you will be asked to guess how well you think you did the test compared to the rest of the
students in the lab. You will do this by specifying your probability estimates for the ranking groups you
see on the screen. We ask you to enter numbers from 0 to 100 for the probabilities for each ranking group.
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Please note that the odds allocated to the groups you see on the screen should always add up to 100%.
For example:

















Probability 5% 10% 40% 10% 5% 0% 0% 0% 100%
If the total of the odds is not 100%, the computer will inform you and you will need to correct your answer
before proceeding to the next stage.
Payment
As we explained above, we will ask you to specify the possibilities for your ranking 5 times in total. One
of the 5 predictions you make will be chosen randomly and we will pay you based on the accuracy of that
prediction. Payment is made according to the formula 32 + 32 log(p). Here, p is the number we find by
dividing the probability that you assign to the category that contains your actual ranking. Note that log(p)
is a zero or negative number, and your payment will be between 0 and 32, depending on how accurate the
prediction is.
Example: For example, if you scored the best score in the test, that is, if your ranking is 1 and f you
correctly guess the probability of being 1st or 2nd as 100%, you earn the highest possible amount. Your
payment is 32 TL (calculation: 32 + 32 ⇥ log(1) = 32).

















Probability 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
However, if your ranking is 1, and you assign a probability lower than 100% for this category, your
earnings will be reduced. This reduction is proportional to the inaccuracy of the probability assigned to
the correct group.
For example, if your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 90%, your payment
will be reduced by 5% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(1.01) = 32   32 ⇥ 0.05 = 30.54 TL.
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Probability 90% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
If your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 80%, your payment will be reduced
by 9.7% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(0.8) = 32   32 ⇥ 0.097 = 28.89 TL.
If your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 70%, your payment will be reduced
by 15.5% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(0.7) = 32   32 ⇥ 0.155 = 27.04 TL.
If your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 60%, your payment will be reduced
by 22.2% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(0.6) = 32   32 ⇥ 0.222 = 24.9 TL.
If your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 50%, your payment will be reduced
by 30.1% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(0.5) = 32   32 ⇥ 0, 301 = 22.37 TL.
If your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 40%, your payment will be reduced
by 39.8% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(0.4) = 32   32 ⇥ 0.398 = 19.27 TL.
If your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 30%, your payment will be reduced
by 52.3% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(0.3) = 32   32 ⇥ 0.523 = 15.27 TL.
If your ranking is 1 and you set the probability of being ‘1st or 2nd’ to 20%, your payment will be reduced
by 69.9% and will be 32 + 32 ⇥ log(0.2) = 32   32 ⇥ 0.699 = 15.27 TL.
Finally, if your ranking is 1, if you set the probability of being 1 or 2 as 10% or less, your payment will
be reduced to 0.
You should try to be as accurate as possible in your predictions. A good estimate will give you the best
benefit.
At the end of the experiment, all your winnings will be paid in cash.
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B.3 Screenshots - Probability updating
We report screenshots of the probability updating task for a participant that did the best score in the





In the FOOT task, we ask participants to compare 15 pairs of players for whom we provide names, team,
and a close-up picture. Table B1 reports the pairs of players that participants face during the experiment.
The team refers to the Turkish League 2017/2018.
Taliska (Besiktas JK) Serdar Aziz (Galatasaray SK)
Garry Rodrigues (Galatasaray SK) Adriano Correia Claro (Besiktas JK)
Mathieu Valbuena (Fenerbahce SK) Aziz Behich (Burnaspor)
Pepe (Besiktas JK) Sofiane Feghouli (Galatasaray SK)
Mustafa Yumlu (Akhisarspor) Maicon Pereira Roque (Galatasaray SK)
Hasan Ali Kaldirim (Fenerbahce SK) Bafétimbi Gomis (Galatasaray SK)
Bogdan Stancu (Burnaspor) Juraj Kucka (Trabzonspor)
Pablo Batalla (Burnaspor) Deniz Kadah (Antalyanspor)
Dusko Tosic (Besiktas JK) Ricardo Quaresma (Besiktas JK)
André Castro (Göztepe) Serginho (Akhisarspor)
Younès Belhanda (Galatasaray SK) Emre Akbaba (Alanyaspor)
Titi (Burnaspor) Burak Yilmaz (Trabzonspor)
Martin Skrtel (Fenerbahce SK) Mehmet Topal (Fenerbahce SK)
Ryan Babel (Besiktas JK) Josef de Souza Dias (Fenerbahce SK)
Roman Neustädter (Fenerbahce SK) Emmanuel Adebayor (Basaksehir)
Table B1: Pairs of players in FOOT test
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C Appendix: Questionnaire
We list here the di erent variables elicited in our post-experimental questionnaire.
• Age of the subject (in years).
• Sex of the subject (1=male, 0=female).
• Living: living arrangement for the subject (0=student housing, 1=with family, 2= with friends,
3=alone).
• Siblings: number of siblings of subject.
• Older siblings: number of siblings who are older than the subject.
• Trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be
very careful in dealing with people?” (Be careful 0 ... 10 can be trusted)
• Risk: “How willing are you to take risks in general?” (0 lowest – 10 highest)
• Major: subject’s major (2=economics, 1=business, political science or international trade, 0=other).
• Econ: number of economics classes (censored at 4).
• Friends: number of people known in the session
• Rely: “How much can we trust the data coming from you in this experiment?” (0 lowest – 10
highest)
78
D Appendix: Additional tables
Persistence of Guessed Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Assortative -0.091 -0.058 0.094 -0.000 -0.123 -0.157
(0.232) (0.164) (0.121) (0.0931) (0.171) (0.132)
Disassortative -0.089 0.579*** 0.062 0.149 0.080 -0.125
(0.227) (0.193) (0.102) (0.0937) (0.118) (0.142)
Constant 4.708*** 12.25*** 6.240*** 13.31*** 12.60*** 26.10***
(0.930) (0.852) (1.594) (1.213) (3.559) (2.637)
Controls YES YES+ YES YES+ YES YES+
Observations 287 288 287 288 287 288
R-squared 0.068 0.136 0.054 0.006 0.028 0.008
Table D1: OLS regression of confidence (guessed rank) on treatment dummies across the various steps of the
belief revision process. Bottom half of performers only. The small set of controls includes age, gender, whether the
participant lives with their parents and whether they have siblings. The large set additionally controls for measures
of risk aversion and trust, whether they are economics students and linearly for how many friends they have. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Guessed Rank - split by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Ranks Rank< 9 Rank> 8
F M F M F M
Assortative 0.006 -0.290 0.177 -0.277 0.007 -0.265
(0.536) (0.582) (0.627) (0.576) (0.578) (0.636)
Disassortative 0.808 0.444 -0.180 0.054 1.378*** 1.208
(0.493) (0.632) (0.703) (0.534) (0.493) (0.723)
Constant 10.34*** 8.678*** 11.07*** 5.769** 9.995*** 7.320***
(1.993) (1.584) (3.166) (2.150) (3.056) (1.991)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 231 344 97 190 134 154
R-squared 0.029 0.012 0.028 0.006 0.076 0.057
Table D2: OLS regression of confidence (guessed rank) at step 2 of the belief revision stage on treatment dummies
split by gender. The small set of controls includes age, whether the participant lives with their parents and whether
they have siblings. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Guessed Rank - split by task
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all ART IQ FOOT
Assortative -0.183 -0.121 0.155 0.155
(0.383) (0.361) (0.578) (0.578)
Disassortative 0.560 0.550 0.405 0.405
(0.424) (0.481) (0.763) (0.763)
Constant 10.26*** 9.902*** 8.976*** 8.976***
(1.194) (1.620) (1.836) (1.836)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 575 191 192 192
R-squared 0.086 0.037 0.330 0.330
Table D3: OLS regression of confidence (guessed rank) at step 2 of the belief
revision stage on treatment dummies split by task. The small set of controls includes
age, gender, whether the participant lives with their parents and whether they have
siblings. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Change in Confidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire Sample Rank< 9 Rank> 8
Assortative 0.265 0.261 0.428** 0.421** 0.126 0.124
(0.255) (0.257) (0.178) (0.174) (0.392) (0.389)
Disassortative 0.0720 0.0743 -0.173 -0.169 0.329 0.365
(0.267) (0.268) (0.210) (0.210) (0.416) (0.423)
Constant 1.463 1.530* 1.324 1.061 0.802 1.320
(0.885) (0.849) (0.842) (0.929) (1.630) (1.497)
Controls YES YES+ YES YES+ YES YES+
Observations 575 575 287 287 288 288
R-squared 0.014 0.017 0.063 0.080 0.014 0.023
Table D4: OLS regression of the Change in Confidence between step 1 and 2 of the belief revision stage on
treatment dummies. The small set of controls includes age, gender, whether the participant lives with their parents
and whether they have siblings. The large set additionally controls for measures of risk aversion and trust, whether
they are economics students and linearly for how many friends they have. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Absolute Error - split by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Ranks Rank< 9 Rank> 8
F M F M F M
Assortative -0.052 -0.001 0.158 -0.051 -0.141 0.061
(0.194) (0.133) (0.226) (0.113) (0.307) (0.249)
Disassortative -0.430* -0.134 0.053 0.205* -0.756*** -0.479*
(0.212) (0.141) (0.202) (0.114) (0.271) (0.279)
Constant 1.142 2.630*** 0.514 1.247* 1.805 2.556**
(1.080) (0.891) (1.400) (0.710) (1.482) (1.046)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 231 345 97 191 134 154
R-squared 0.039 0.007 0.025 0.028 0.077 0.035
Table D5: OLS regression of Absolute Error at step 2 of the belief revision stage on treatment dummies split by
gender. The small set of controls includes age, whether the participant lives with their parents and whether they
have siblings. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Absolute Error - split by task
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all ART IQ FOOT
Assortative -0.014 0.125 -0.152 -0.079
(0.092) (0.110) (0.149) (0.174)
Disassortative -0.245** -0.359*** -0.325 -0.080
(0.101) (0.037) (0.185) (0.138)
Constant 2.299*** 2.184** 2.923* 2.427*
(0.732) (0.743) (1.475) (1.329)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 576 192 192 192
R-squared 0.013 0.036 0.024 0.005
Table D6: OLS regression of Absolute Error at step 2 of the belief revision stage
on treatment dummies split by task. The small set of controls includes age, gender,
whether the participant lives with their parents and whether they have siblings.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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E Appendix: Additional figures
Figure E1: Score distributions for the three tasks.
Figure E2: Histogram of Average Guessed Rank at step 2 of the belief revision stage.
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This paper uses a lab experiment to study how incidental a ects influence decisions and beliefs in two
classical choice situations - a dictator game and an e ort task. We employ music to provoke an exogenous
shift in participants’ a ective state after they enter the lab. The experimental design is between-subject. We
vary the valence - positive or negative - of the a ect induced and the moment, in the timeline of the experi-
ment, when participants listen to the music. Decisions and beliefs under the e ect of the exogenous a ective
activation are compared to a baseline where participants’ a ective state remains untouched. The analysis
reveals that incidental a ects reduce altruism. Moreover, our treatments show that participants with high
trait emotional intelligence (Petrides et al., 2007) strategically manage their beliefs when under the influence
of the exogenous a ective activation. Both in the dictator game and e ort task, they appear to overestimate
the likelihood of the negative outcome. We conjecture that they adopt a strategic pessimism approach as
a way of protecting themselves from the emotional reaction should the negative outcome materialize. We
also find that high trait emotional intelligence is predictive of the outcome in the e ort task. Here, the
decrease in confidence induced by incidental a ects in participants with high trait emotional intelligence gen-
erates a decrease of 9% in e ort provision. This result confirms the importance of confidence for performance.




A ects are general feelings of pleasure or displeasure accompanied by arousing or quieting bodily
activation. Several studies in cognitive psychology suggest that a ects can influence what we think and
remember (Bower, 1981; Forgas and Bower, 1987; Kavanagh and Bower, 1985; Bower et al., 1981), and
how we reason (Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Isen and Reeve, 2005). Neuroscientific data show that a ective
states and higher cognition are integrated in the brain (Barrett, 2017a; Schaefer et al., 2002) indicating
that rational decision-making and the processing of a ects are intertwined. Those studies suggest that
a ective states are relevant for beliefs formation and choices even when unrelated to the judgement at
hand (i.e., they are incidental).
Despite the relevance the topic, few researchers in economics have tried to model the influence
of incidental a ects on decision-making (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; Loewenstein, 2000) and the
experimental evidence is still very limited (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006;
Capra, 2004; Oswald et al., 2015; Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016; Proto et al., 2019; Oswald et al.,
2015). A fundamental question not yet addressed in the literature is whether incidental a ects influence
the way people manage their beliefs. This question is particularly relevant in light of the theories on
belief-dependent preferences (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009; Köszegi and Rabin, 2006) that suggest
that expectations could act as a reference point a ecting people’s decisions both in interactive games and
individual tasks. In this framework, identifying what is preference and what is belief-driven becomes
crucial. The present paper aims at filling this gap and investigates the influence of incidental a ects on
decisions and beliefs in two classical choice situations - a dictator game and an e ort task - using a lab
experiment.
We design an A ect Induction Procedure (AIP) to provoke an exogenous shift in participants’ a ective
state after they enter the lab. Through a series of pilot sessions, we identify two music tracks that induce
high arousal and feelings with positive or negative valence. During the experiment, we ask participants
to listen to one of the music tracks to produce the incidental a ects with the desired valence. Besides the
AIP, the experiment has two other main stages: a dictator game and an e ort task with belief elicitation.
Then, we collect extensive data on participants ability to recognize others’ emotions and self-evaluation
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on their capacity to manage and be aware of their own and others’ emotional states. Finally, we collect
measures of cognitive ability, risk attitudes, demographics and music tastes or experience.
The experimental design is between-subject. We vary the valence - positive or negative - of the a ect
induced and the moment, in the timeline of the experiment, when participants experience the AIP. The
variation in timing aims at inducing incidental a ects at di erent stages during the experiment to identify
the influence of our treatments on each choice, performance and elicited belief in the two main tasks.
Decisions and beliefs under the e ect of the AIP are compared to a neutral baseline where participants’
a ective state remains untouched. The design allows us to separately study the e ect of a change in
valence combined with an increase in arousal on belief management and decision-making.
Our study finds its main theoretical underpinnings in the psychological literature, with few contribu-
tions from the field of economics. Di erent authors theorize that both positive and negative a ects should
promote helpfulness and altruism (Carlson et al., 1988; Isen and Simmonds, 1978). Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue (2007) attempt to explain helping behavior by modelling the interaction between an a ective
and a deliberative system. Based on a review of empirical findings, Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) suggest a
conceptual model that explains the association between positive a ects and confidence, self-e cacy, and
success. Oswald et al. (2015) propose a microeconomic model of emotional internal resource allocation
that links (un)happiness and (decreased) productivity. Several theories link incidental a ects to beliefs
management strategies (Isen and Simmonds, 1978; Cialdini et al., 1973; Weber, 1994) and the recalling of
events from memory (Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Bandura, 1977). Despite a large number of experimental
studies (the vast majority focusing on the a ect-helpfulness link), the evidence is still controversial and
the problems associated with the various AIPs adopted are often neglected. We believe our paper adds to
the existing literature by providing new evidence based on a sound experimental methodology. Moreover,
we explore the link between incidental a ects and belief management which has never been explored in
an incentivized setting.
We believe that people might react di erently to incidental a ects and heterogeneity might be one of
the causes of the inconclusive evidence encountered in the literature. Some scholars (Yip and Côté, 2013)
argue that the ability to understand their own and others’ emotions might help to pinpoint the correct
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source of incidental feelings and become aware of their irrelevance for the decision at hand. We explore
this heterogeneity by collecting extensive data on participants’ ‘emotional intelligence’. We are well
aware of the debate concerning the nature of the construct and we choose to adopt measures pertaining to
the two main competing approaches on the topic - the ‘ability’ approach (Salovey and Mayer, 1990) and
trait emotional intelligence (Petrides et al., 2007). We conjecture that participant with high emotional
intelligence should be the ones better equipped to recognize the incidental nature of a ects attenuating
their influence on decisions and beliefs.
To a large extent, the results of our experiment do not confirm the theoretical predictions. Positive
a ects significantly decrease altruism in the dictator game. Also, dictators believe more recipients expect
them to be selfish after listening to positive music compared to the baseline. We find no significant e ect
of the AIP on recipients’ beliefs, participants’ confidence or performance in the e ort task. When we
study the interaction between treatments and emotional intelligence, we find no e ect for the ‘ability
measure but a significant heterogeneity related to trait emotional intelligence. Participants with high trait
emotional intelligence are the ones that seem to be a ected the most by the treatments. Our results suggest
that they might strategically overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome as a way of protecting
themselves from the emotional reaction should the negative outcome materialize (Shepperd et al., 2000;
Risen and Gilovich, 2007).
We test the hypothesis that beliefs act as a reference point a ecting decisions in the dictator game and
performance in the e ort task by conducting a mediation analysis (Mackinnon et al., 2007; Imai et al.,
2010). We assume that dictators might be guilt averse (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) and bear a
psychological cost when they let their partner down. It follows that the observed e ect of the positive
music on dictators’ choices might be indirectly and partly driven by the shift in beliefs. In fact, the
above-described increase of second order beliefs in the dictator game should reduce the psychological
cost of guilt associated with the selfish choice thus making that option more attractive. However, we do
not find a significant mediation e ect of beliefs on altruism. We perform a similar analysis for the e ort
task assuming that confidence might act as a motivational boost (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002) and sustain
e ort. The analysis confirms that confidence is a mediator of performance for participants with high
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trait emotional intelligence. For them, the decrease in confidence generates a decrease of 9% in e ort
provision.
This study is the first that tries to separately identify the e ect of incidental a ects on decision-making
and beliefs and explore the relation between belief management and decision-making. Our results are
relevant because they point to the capacity, for a relevant proportion of the population, of strategically
managing their beliefs in an attempt to cope with the consequences of the choices that they and others
make. This study supports the idea that beliefs not always reflect the individuals’ knowledge concerning
the state of the world but the mechanism through which we form beliefs might be more complex (Schwarz
and Clore, 1983) and deserve further investigation. Moreover, our experiment lends partial support to
belief-dependent theories by means of a novel experimental design. The mediation analysis indicates
that performance can be significantly a ected by beliefs. Understanding how incidental a ects influence
preferences and beliefs adds crucially on the debate concerning stability of preference (Stigler and
Becker, 1977) and belief-dependent motivation (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg,
2009; Köszegi, 2006).
In section 2 we describe the AIP and test its e cacy. Section 3 gives details on the experimental
design and procedure, describes the experimental treatments, and introduces our conjectures. Section
4 is devoted to the statistical analysis and section 5 speculates on the possible mechanism driving the
results paving the ground for future research. Section 6 concludes. The appendices report experimental
instructions, additional analysis and robustness checks.
2 A ect Induction Procedure (AIP)
In this section, we discuss the AIP and present an assessment of its validity. First, we motivate the
choice of the AIP adopted in the study. Second, we present the treatment manipulation check and the
experimental procedures adopted in the pilot sessions. Third, we present the results of the pilot sessions.
Finally, we comment on our methodological contribution.
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2.1 Why a ects?
The decision to focus on a ects, rather than emotions or moods, stems from three considerations. The first
has its roots in the scientific discussion about emotions that calls into questions the existence of emotions
intended as discrete categories. Our research refers to the theory of constructed emotions (Barrett, 2017b)
that questions the assumption that emotions are genetically endowed and produced by dedicated circuits in
the brain. According to this theory, what exists in the brain and body is a ect while emotions are complex
and culturally driven concepts that can be controlled through perspective taking and re-categorization. As
such emotions are not ‘reactions’ to external events nor they are universal. We thus expect a standardised
procedure to reliably induce a ects but not emotions.
The other two considerations are methodological. We argue that variations in arousal and valence can
be accurately measured using self-reported questionnaires. Several studies show that people are usually
able to give an explicit account of pleasant and unpleasant feelings using a variety of self-rating scales
(Barrett and Russell, 1998; Bradley and Lang, 1994; Carroll et al., 1999; Lang et al., 1993). Moreover,
facial expressions highly correlate with a ective valence judgements and skin conductance magnitude
with arousal ratings (Greenwald et al., 1998; Lang et al., 1993). Thus, surveys provide a cheap and easy
way to test the e cacy of the procedure. The measurement of variations in specific emotions or moods
requires the use of biometrics or more sophisticated forms of self-assessment which we cannot expect
from all participants. Finally, we are confident that a laboratory procedure could e ectively induce short
term variations in a ects with a standardized procedure. The same might not be true for emotions or
moods. Some authors (Martin, 1990) argue that inducing emotions might encounter the issue of specificity
since emotional states can overlap (e.g., sadness and anxiety) (Goldberg and Huxley, 1980) or depend on
idiosyncratic cognitive assessment (Barrett, 2017a). Other authors (Marston et al., 1984) note that only a
low level of intensity of mood can be induced. Another peculiarity of moods - their duration - might be
hard to create in the lab as the e ect of the procedure tends to fade out quickly.
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2.2 Why music as induction procedure?
Psychologists use many di erent techniques to induce a ective states in the lab. Most studies rely on
recollection of autobiographical events, short films, or imaging of emotional situations - like the so-called
Velten procedure (Velten, 1968).1 The idea of using music to induce a ective states in the lab was first
introduced by Clark (1983). Studies reviewing the e ectiveness of several AIPs have concluded that
music is among the most e ective (Westermann et al., 1996; Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994; Martin, 1990).
The original procedure contains instructions about how participants should go about obtaining the desired
a ective states, but later studies minimize such instructions (Pignatiello et al., 1986). In the experiment,
we also use minimal instructions.2 An important advantage of our procedure is that it minimizes demand
e ects and cognitive priming which significantly interfere with other techniques (Westermann et al.,
1996). Also, it appears to be particularly suitable to induce a ects, rather than specific emotions.
2.2.1 Selection of music tracks
The starting point of our research is the review of Västfjäll (2001) which provides a list of music tracks
used in previous experimental studies. We select 2 (2) tracks from the list to induce high arousal and
positive (negative) valence. The tracks for the positive valence are Delibes, L. (1870) Coppelia (Mazurka,
Act I, No. 3) and Bach, J. S. (1977) Brandenburg Concerto No. 2, BWV 1047 (First Movement; Allegro).
The tracks for the negative valence are Moussorgsky, M. (1988) Night on Bald Mountain and Holst, G.
(1986) The Planets: Mars, the bringer of war. Given the poor results concerning the e cacy of the music
to induce negative valence (see section 2.5.2), we test an additional track. This is Farsa Del Buen Vivir
by Merzbow, a track of noise music3 that has never been tested or used in lab experiments before. All the
music tracks have been cut to a duration of just over 4 minutes.
1For a comprehensive list of studies using a ect induction procedures see the reviews by Westermann et al. (1996);
Gerrards-Hesse et al. (1994); Martin (1990).
2We ask subjects to ‘listen to the music and tune with it’.
3Noise music is a category of music that is characterized by the expressive use of noise within a musical context.
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2.3 Treatment manipulation check
We test the e cacy of the music tracks in a series of pilot sessions using several self-reported question-
naires. First, we use the A ect grid (Russell et al., 1989), a scale designed as a quick means of assessing
a ects along the dimensions of pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness. The A ect grid is a kind
of map for feelings (see Figure 1) where the centre of the square represents a neutral, average, everyday
feeling. The (left) right half of the grid represents (un)pleasant feelings. The farther to the (left) right
the more (un)pleasant. The vertical dimension of the map represents the degree of arousal. The top half
is for feelings that are above average in arousal. The lower half for feelings below average. Participants
should select the square that best describes how they felt after listening to music.
Figure 1: A ect grid Russel et al. (1989)
The A ect grid is easy to administer. It is a 9-point scale o ering substantial variations in the two
dimensions under analysis. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is a lack of studies confronting
the evaluation given with the A ect grid with biometric measures. We thus decided to administer a
second questionnaire - the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Bradley and Lang, 1994) - that was proven
to have a strong correlation with skin conductance and facial expressions (Greenwald, Cook, and Lang,
1988; Lang et al., 1993). The SAM provides a non-verbal pictorial representation of the concepts of
arousal and valence and a variation on a 5-points scale across the two dimensions. Participants should
select the images (see Figure 2) that best describe their reaction to the music.4 The comparison of the
4The test also includes an assessment of Dominance. The data concerning the Dominance scale are not reported as they
are beyond the scope of our research.
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Figure 2: Self-assessment Manikin (Bradley and Lang, 1994) - Valence scale on top, arousal below
data extracted from the two questionnaires could provide a test of the internal consistency of the data and
a sensible treatment manipulation check.
To further understand how participants perceive the music, they complete the Positive A ect Negative
A ect Schedule (PANAS)(Watson et al., 1988), a self-report questionnaire that consists of two 10-item
scales to measure both positive and negative a ects. Participants are asked to indicate to what extent they
felt in the way described by the items after listening to the music. The words related to negative a ects
are: distressed, upset, hostile, irritable, scared, afraid, ashamed, guilty, nervous, and jittery. The words
related to positive a ects are attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, inspired, proud, determined,
strong, and active. Participants choose one option out of a 5-Likert scale, from ‘very slightly or not at all’
to ‘extremely’.
Finally, we use a post-experimental questionnaire to collect demographics and ask some control
questions regarding the music tracks and their appreciation (see A for details).
2.4 Pilot sessions - procedure
The e cacy of the music tracks was tested in a series of pilot sessions. The sessions took place in June
2018 at the EssexLab of the University of Essex. The participants were recruited through the ESSEXLab
91
Online Recruitment System and invited to take part in a computerized session at the lab on campus.
The research received Ethical Approval from the Social Sciences Faculty Ethics Sub-Committee of the
University of Essex. Conforming to departmental ethics guidelines and current practice in experimental
research with human subjects, participants read and signed informed consent before taking part in the
sessions. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The pilot sessions involved 66 participants; more than 90% were students. Experimental sessions
consisted of 8 to 20 participants. They were randomly assigned to cubicles and told that all the instructions
would appear on the computer screen. For the screenshots of the experiment, see Appendix A.
Participants in all AIP conditions were asked to wear headphones and listen to the music before
completing the questionnaires. Participants in the baseline condition were asked to complete the ques-
tionnaires right after the assignment to cubicles without listening to any audio recording. The sessions
lasted on average 30 minutes, and participants earned a flat fee of 7 Pounds.
2.5 Pilot sessions - results
2.5.1 Positive valence
Figure 3 shows the mean values for the A ect grid and SAM obtained in the pilot sessions testing Bach
and Delibes’s tracks. Delibes’s Coppelia consistently generates higher arousal and positive valence with
respect to the baseline condition. The data of both the SAM and A ect grid indicate a significant increase
in arousal and the di erence in valence is highly significant when considering the SAM. The track by
Bach seems to be increasing positive valence and arousal but the e ect is sensibly weaker.
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Figure 3: Mean scores in the tests for Bach, Delibes, and Baseline. Stars refer to one-sided t-test with
null hypothesis Baseline < Delibes; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Sample size is 8 for Bach, 8
for Delibes, and 20 for baseline.
Delibes’s track also provokes an increase in the mean of all the evaluations concerning positive words
in the PANAS, but the overall variation is not significant. Enthusiastic, proud, and inspired are the items
that increase the most, displaying a marginally significant increase. On average, there is no variation
in the overall evaluation concerning the negative words of the PANAS and none of the items is a ected
significantly. The pilot sessions give support to the e cacy of Delibes’s track in inducing high arousal
and positive a ect. We thus use Delibes’s Coppelia in the main experiment.
2.5.2 Negative valence
Figure 4 shows the mean values for the A ect grid and SAM in the pilot sessions testing Holst, Moussor-
gosky and Merzbow’s tracks. The two pieces of classical music seem ine ective in generating negative
valence feelings. In fact, participants reported more positive a ects compared to subjects in the baseline
after listening to Holst or Moussorgosky. This unexpected result appears to be driven by the interaction
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between music taste and valence: participants who appreciate the music also report positive feelings (see
Appendix B for analysis).
Figure 4: Mean scores in the tests for Holst, Moussorgosky, Merzbow, and Baseline. Stars refer to
one-sided t-test with null hypothesis Baseline >Merzbow for valence, Baseline <Merzbow for arousal;
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 . Sample size is 8 for Holst, 8 for Moussorgosky, 14 for Merzbow,
and 20 for baseline.
The music track by Merzbow seems to be highly e ective as participants report significantly higher
arousal and lower valence than subjects in the baseline. Merzbow also provokes a significant decrease in
the positive items of the PANAS and increase in the negative ones. Interested, excited, and enthusiastic
are the positive items that decrease the most; distressed, irritable and jittery are the negative items that
increase the most. The variation in all the above-mentioned items of the PANAS is significant at 1% level.
We thus use Merzobow’s Farsa Del Buen Vivir in the main experiment.
2.6 Methodological contribution
A review of the experimental literature on incidental a ects in incentivized settings reveal several areas
of weakness. First, many studies (Bosman and Riedl, 2003; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; Capra, 2004)
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compare positive and negative mood/emotion conditions, without using a neutral baseline. However,
the independence of positive and negative a ect is well-established: a ects with opposite valence do
not necessarily have opposite e ects on behavior (Diener and Emmons, 1984; Watson et al., 1988;
Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Isen, 1990). There is substantial evidence suggesting that emotions with
opposite valence can exert similar influences (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Keltner et al., 1993;
DeSteno et al., 2000). Second, experimental studies adopt di erent AIPs5 without adequately discussing
their downsides. Westermann et al. (1996) warn against the risk of demand e ects in procedures where
participants are explicitly instructed to try to enter a specified mood state - like in the Velten procedure,
or memory elicitation - or when the a ective states is measured right after the procedure (as in Drouvelis
and Grosskopf, 2016; Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013; Capra, 2004; Capra et al., 2010; Kirchsteiger et al.,
2006).
Our study addresses several drawbacks observed in the experimental literature. First, we use a neutral
baseline to separately study the e ect of positive and negative a ective states. Then, we use a pilot session
to test the e cacy of the procedure and avoid measuring the a ective state right during the experimental
sessions. Finally, we use a procedure - music - with minimal demand e ect or possibility for priming.
3 Experimental design, procedure, and conjectures
3.1 Design
Besides the AIP, the experiment involves four incentivized stages. See Appendix C for the screenshots of
the experiment and the full set of instructions.
STAGE 1: Dictator Game - Participants are matched to play a one-shot dictator game. Dictators
are endowed with 10 Pounds and have to decide how to split the amount choosing one of the following
allocations: (7, 3), (5, 5) or (3, 7). After the decision stage, players enter the belief elicitation stage.
Recipients are asked to guess the percentage of dictators in the lab making each of the three choices.
5The economic literature relied on video clips (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016; Ifcher and
Zarghamee, 2011), Velten procedure Oswald et al. (2015), experience of success/failure (Capra, 2004; Capra et al., 2010;
Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013), memory elicitation (Capra, 2004; Capra et al., 2010).
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Dictators are asked to guess on the guesses of the recipients. Each guess within 5% from the realization is
rewarded with 2 Pounds.6 The payo  of STAGE 1 is the sum of the outcome of the game and the rewards.
STAGE 2: E ort Task - Participants are asked to count the number of zeros in matrices containing
only 0 and 1 as in Abeler et al. (2016). Each matrix contains 50 numbers in total. Participants have to
enter the number of zeros they think is right and press the ‘ok’ button. Then, a new table appears on the
screen, regardless of whether the entry was correct or wrong. Participants have to count as many tables
as possible in 4 minutes. Each correct table is worth 50 cents and nothing is subtracted from participants’
earnings if the entry is wrong. Before the e ort task participants are asked to reveal their beliefs regarding
how well they will do in the task. They are asked to state the probability of belonging to each of the
quartiles of the score distribution. Correct guesses are incentivized using a logarithmic scoring rule.
The payo  of STAGE 2 is calculated either according to the score in the task or to the guess with equal
probability.
STAGE 3: Cognitive skills and risk attitudes - We use two IQ-type questions as in Bigoni et al.
(2015) to measure cognitive skills. Each correct answer is worth 2 Pounds. For the risk task, we use the
Eckel and Grossman task (Eckel and Grossman, 2002). The payo  of STAGE 3 is calculated by summing
the outcome of the lottery with that of the IQ-type task.
STAGE 4: Emotional intelligence - The measurement of emotional intelligence is a cumbersome
task as there is no consensus in the literature regarding the nature of the construct. There are two main
competing approaches. Some authors believe that there is a set of abilities to validly reason with emotions
and to use emotions to enhance thought (Salovey et al., 2004). According to this view, individuals can
be more or less capable of solving certain categories of problems about emotions and thus they are more
or less ‘emotionally intelligent’ (Salovey and Mayer, 1990). However, the concept of emotional ‘ability’
has been heavily criticized. Many scholars argue that it is poorly defined and measured (see Matthews,
Gerald et al., 2004 for a comprehensive critical review on the topic). We refer to this set of ideas as the
‘ability’ approach.
A competing approach (Petrides et al., 2007; Tett et al., 2005) construes emotional intelligence as
6We choose this incentive scheme instead of other proper scoring rules because it is simple and easy to describe in
instructions.
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a set of personality traits. Scholars of trait emotional intelligence propose to use a categorization of
personality traits that is domain-specific rather than based on five broad and orthogonal dimensions. Thus
trait emotional intelligence refers to personality traits in the emotional domain.
It is not the purpose of this research to contribute to the discussion on emotional intelligence. We thus
choose to rely on measures pertaining to both approaches. The ‘ability’ approach has the advantage of
relying on measures of maximal performance. For this reason, we could construct an incentive compatible
test based on a selection of items from ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes,’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) ‘Reading
the Mind in Films,’ (Golan et al., 2006) and ‘Reading the Mind in Voices’ (Golan et al., 2007) tests. The
tests are intended to measure the ability to recognize emotional states and consist of a series of eyes
pictures, audio recordings and video where participants have to attribute the correct emotion to the eyes,
speaker and actor.7 Beside the emotion recognition task, we use a small selection of questions (4 items in
total) on the verbal knowledge of emotions. The payo  of STAGE 4 is calculated by randomly selecting
two subtasks and summing the correct items in those subtasks. Each correct item is worth 1 Pound.
The measure of trait emotional intelligence consists in a self-reported questionnaire - the Trait Emo-
tional Intelligence Short Form questionnaire or TEIQue-SF (Petrides, 2009) - which measures participants’
self-perception of their own emotional self-e cacy, i.e., how good they believe they are in terms of un-
derstanding, regulating, and expressing emotions in order to adapt to their environment and maintain
well-being. The TEIQue-SF is a 30-item questionnaire where responses are expressed in a 7-Likert scale.
Appendix C.4 reports the full questionnaire.
In the remaining of the experiment, participants complete a short survey to assess their proneness to
guilt - the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP) (Cohen et al., 2011). In the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire, we collect demographics and some control questions that are intended to measure participants
understanding of the goal of the experiment and their appreciation of the music tracks.8
Participants are paid two randomly chosen payo s among the incentivized stages 1 to 4 described
above. A show-up fee of 4 Pounds is added to the final payo  of the experiment.
7We refer to the above-mentioned papers for details on the items and a definition of what ‘correct emotion’ means.
8This last item could provide a useful check on the e cacy of the AIP as argued in Appendix B.
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3.2 Experimental treatments
The experimental design is between-subject with randomization at session-level. There are 8 treatment
conditions that vary along two dimensions: the timing and the valence of the a ect induced with the AIP.
Table 1 reports an overview of our treatments where DG stands for dictator game, ET for e ort task.
Each column describes the timeline of one treatment in which the coloured cells represent the exact time
when the participants listen to the music track (blue cells correspond to Delibes’s Coppelia, green cells
to Merzbow Farsa del Buen Vivir). Besides the 8 treatments, we collect data in a neutral condition where
participants complete the stages described in 3.1 without listening to any music.
Table 1: Experimental treatments
The variation in timing aims at provoking the exogenous a ective activation at di erent stages during
the experiment in order to identify its e ect on elicited beliefs, choices and e ort without concerns about
the duration of the e ect of the AIP. Moreover, it allows us to analyse the persistence of the e ects
generated by the music in the e ort task. A significant e ect of Timing 1 and/or 2 treatment on the beliefs
and/or performance in the e ort task, would suggest that the variation in a ect is persistent. Such analysis
also provides tentative information on the duration of the e ect of the AIP.
3.3 Procedures
The experiment took place in 2018 and 2019 at the EssexLab of the University of Essex. The recruitment
procedure followed the same practice and guidelines described for the pilot sessions. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
The research involved 364 participants, 91% were students, 55% females. We ran 14 experimental
sessions consisting of 20 to 32 participants. Participants could read the instructions on the computer
screen and were asked to wear headphones to listen to the music and complete the emotional ability tests.
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The sessions lasted on average 86 minutes, including random assignment to cubicles, answering the
post-experimental questionnaire and receiving payments. The participants earned an average of 16 pounds
(including the show-up fee). See Appendix D for the schedule of the experimental sessions, Appendix
E for the random assignment check and Appendix F for a discussion on the independence between the
emotional intelligence measures and the treatments.
3.4 Conjectures
The theory of constructed emotions (Barrett, 2017b) posits that the primary purpose of an organism’s
brain is to regulate the physiological resources required to meet the organism’s short and long-term needs.
The energy regulation process is optimized when the brain anticipates bodily needs (Sterling, 2015).
Our AIP targets a ects inducing a surge in arousal and increasing the pleasantness/unpleasantness of
the bodily activation. The heightened bodily arousal should shape predictions concerning the presence
or likelihood of threats that would necessitate the current bodily arousal, directing perception and action
accordingly (Fridman, Barrett, Wormwood, and Quigley, Fridman et al.). How arousal and valence relate
to one another is still an open question (see Kuppens, Tuerlinckx, Russell, and Barrett, Kuppens et al.
for a discussion). Several studies suggest the prevalence of a V-shaped relation of arousal as a function
of valence but warn about the presence of a variety of relations depending on person or circumstances
(Kuppens, Tuerlinckx, Russell, and Barrett, Kuppens et al.; Barrett, 1998; Ito and Cacioppo, Ito and
Cacioppo).
Our conjectures rely on existing experimental evidence on incidental a ects which has traditionally
focused on discrete emotions or positive/negative a ects without commenting upon the role played by
arousal.
3.4.1 Incidental a ects and altruism
A substantial body of research in psychology shows that positive a ective states promote helpfulness and
altruism (for instance Isen, 1970, 1987; Isen and Levin, 1972; Weyant, 1978). The same result occurs
using music to induce a ect (Fried and Berkowitz, 1979). Several models have been proposed to explain
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the results (for a review see Carlson et al., 1988). Experimental studies that investigate the e ect of
incidental emotion in one-shot economic decisions confirm that individuals in a positive a ective state
are more altruistic and trusting (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016; Capra, 2004;
Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005).
In contrast to what might have been expected on the intuitive ground, there is strong empirical
evidence in support of the thesis that also negative a ects increase altruism and helping behavior (for
instance Weyant, 1978; Manucia et al., 1984; Cialdini et al., 1987, for reviews Cialdini and Fultz, 1990 and
Carlson and Miller, 1987). The dominant model is the mood maintenance hypothesis (Isen et al., 1978;
Batson et al., 1989) according to which people in a negative mood try to restore an equilibrium condition
through positive action. Experimental economic studies mainly compare a positive a ect condition with
a negative one, without using a neutral baseline. People under negative a ects are generally considered
less altruistic and helping than subjects in a positive a ective state.
However, the evidence is not uncontroversial. For instance, Proto et al. (2019) find that players with
an induced positive mood tend to cooperate less than players in a neutral mood setting. Also, there
are studies showing reduced helping in subjects in a negative mood (Isen, 1970; Berkowitz and Connor,
1966). Moreover, it must be noted that the extreme variety of experimental methodologies adopted leave
room for di erent interpretations of the results. Nonetheless, our first conjecture follows the majority of
the results encountered in the literature.
Conjecture 1 - Both positive and negative a ects induce altruistic behavior.
3.4.2 Incidental a ects and performance
People experiencing positive a ects have been associated with confidence, optimism, self-e cacy, and
energy (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Those characteristics are typically associated with success. However,
the experimental evidence on incidental a ects and task performance is rather mixed and context-specific
(see Lyubomirsky et al., 2005 for a review). Some studies have shown that those put in a pleasant mood
outperform others. For example, subjects in a positive mood solve more anagrams correctly (Erez and
Isen, 2002) and perform better in a clerical coding task (Baron, 1990). Subjects in induced happy moods
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also appear to persist longer at tasks in which perseverance is required (Erez and Isen, 2002; Kavanagh,
1987) and show greater creativity that those in a neutral state (Isen et al., 1987). Other authors argue that
positive a ective states can be detrimental for performance as they tend to favour the use of heuristics,
whereas negative a ective states promote analytical thinking (the sadder-but-wiser hypothesis by Forgas,
1995; George and Zhou, 2002). There is indeed evidence that participants placed in a negative a ective
state outperformed participants in a neutral/positive state (Melton, 1995; Bless et al., 1990; Elsbach and
Barr, 1999). The above-mentioned research has concentrated on unpaid experimental settings.
Economists and management scientists still know relatively little about the causal linkages between
incidental a ects and e ort in incentivized settings. There is a general expectation that happy workers
are more productive and those in a negative a ective state are less productive but the evidence is scarce.
In a series of experiments, Oswald et al. (2015) consistently find that happiness raises productivity by
comparing subject in an induced happy state to a neutral control group. Dalton et al. (2017) find a
positive correlation between negative a ective states and a decrease in productivity. We believe that our
experiment is likely to reproduce those results.
Conjecture 2 - Positive (negative) a ects increase (decrease) performance.
3.4.3 Incidental a ects and beliefs
In the psychological literature, we find many theories according to which incidental a ects should
influence beliefs directly or indirectly through the recalling of events from memory. According to the
a ect-as-information model (Schwarz and Clore, 1983), a ective states have a direct e ect on beliefs. In
fact, people use their a ective states as a sample of experience of the object of judgement. A ects are
used to produce a quick judgement of a situation without trying to integrate the external characteristics
with their own memory and internal associations. For instance, if people feel good about something they
are more likely to believe in a good outcome happening. Bandura (1977) stresses the importance of mood
congruence in memory activation. The emotional state activates memories consistent with the a ect:
positive emotions facilitate the recall of successful experiences, negative emotion of failure.
Some authors link a ective states to belief management strategies. Isen and Simmonds (1978)
101
introduce the mood maintenance hypothesis - people in a positive a ective state try to maintain their
good-mood states by recalling positive material in memory or making actions that make them feel good.
Cialdini et al. (1973) propose the negative state relief hypothesis suggesting that people in negative
a ective states might try to change their emotional state by adopting behaviors similar to those of people
in a positive a ective state. Weber (1994) argue that people might strategically overestimate the likelihood
of a negative outcome as a way of protecting themselves from the emotional reaction should the negative
outcome materialize (Shepperd et al., 2000; Risen and Gilovich, 2007). In fact, unexpected outcomes
have a greater emotional impact than expected ones (Mellers et al., 1997).
There is a lack of studies on the influence of incidental a ects on beliefs in incentivized settings.
To the best of my knowledge, the only one is Proto et al. (2019). The authors elicit participants beliefs
in a prisoner’s dilemma and find that participants in the neutral mood treatment have more accurate
beliefs about their partners’ choices compared to participants that were induced a positive mood. Given
the scarcity of experimental evidence and the conflicting predictions of the theories, we do not make
conjecture concerning how incidental a ect might influence beliefs. However, we do claim that beliefs
might mediate choices in the dictator game - as suggested by Psychological Game theory (Geanakoplos
et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) - and performance in the e ort task - as suggested
by motivational theory (Bandura and Cervone, 1986; Cervone, 1993; Locke and Latham, 1990) and
reference- dependent models (Köszegi, 2006).
Conjecture 3 - If incidental a ects significantly influence beliefs, the variation should partly explain
the influence of incidental a ects on altruism and performance.
3.4.4 Incidental a ects and heterogeneity
People might react di erently to exogenous a ective activations and heterogeneity might be one of
the causes of the mixed evidence encountered in the literature. Yip and Côté (2013) argue that the
ability to read emotional states might help in understanding the biasing e ects that incidental a ects
exert on cognition. Following this line of reasoning, our conjecture is that people with low emotional
intelligence could be more influenced by incidental a ects and the mechanism underlying this e ect
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involves pinpointing the correct source of the feeling and, in turn, becoming aware that incidental a ects
are irrelevant to decisions at hand. On the other hand, higher levels of emotional intelligence should
attenuate the impact of incidental a ect on decisions and beliefs.
Conjecture 4 - The influence of incidental a ects on choices, performance and beliefs is heteroge-
neous across participants with di erent level of emotional intelligence. Participants with high emotional
intelligence should not be biased.
4 Data Analysis
4.1 Descriptives
Table 2 reports summary statistics. In the dictator game, nearly 45% of the dictators choose the selfish
option (7,3), all the others (except 1) the fair split (5, 5). Almost half of the recipients expect the dictators
to make the selfish choice; almost half of the dictators believe the recipients expect them to be selfish.
Variable name Range Mean SD Min Max
Dictator game
Dictator’s choice (discrete) 1-3 1.55 0.50 1 3
FOB(7,3): recipients’ beliefs on dictators choosing (7,3) 0-1 0.49 0.22 0.05 1
SOB(7,3): dictators’ beliefs on FOB(7,3) 0-1 0.49 0.19 0 1
E ort task
Beliefs on performing in the top quartile 0-1 0.45 0.28 0 1
Beliefs on performing in the second best quartile 0-1 0.33 0.19 0 1
Number of correct tables completed 0-26 13.66 4.09 1 26
Number of attempted tables 1-40 16.97 3.96 3 29
Emotional ‘ability’ 0-16 11.21 2.34 5 16
Trait emotional intelligence 0-7 4.96 0.75 2.7 6.53
Table 2: Summary statistics. Dictator’s choice coding is as follows: 1 corresponds to (7,3), 2 to (5,5), and 3 to (3,7).
In the e ort task, participants are on average overconfident. Nearly 45% of the participants believe
they would perform in the top 25%, and more than 75% in the top half. On average, participants completed
a little less than 14 tables correctly out of almost 17 attempted. Only 3 participants completed less than
3 tables in 4 minutes.
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On average, participants correctly answered 11 questions of the emotional ‘ability’ task, with a
standard deviation of 2.34. The trait emotional intelligence average score lies very near to the values
obtained in other studies that used the TEIQue-SF with representative samples (Cooper and Petrides,
2010). High scores in the test indicate that the person views themselves as flexible in their approach
to life and willing and able to adapt to new environments and conditions. To the contrary, low scorers
perceive themselves as change-resistant and have fixed ideas and views. Additional descriptive statistics
are available in Appendix G. In Appendix H, we explore the correlation between emotional intelligence
and demographics and find no systematic correlation.
4.2 Average treatment e ect
We estimate the following equation:
Yi = ↵ +  Treatmenti +  1Xi,1 + ... +  M Xi,M + ✏i (4)
where Yi is one of the variables of interest, Treatmenti is a discrete variable indicating the treatment
where the excluded category is the baseline, and Xi,1...Xi,M are control variables.
We use an Ordinary Least Squares specification with robust standard errors and control for age, gender,
number of siblings, education, cognitive skills, and risk attitudes. Table 3 reports the raw coe cients of the
regression analysis. The dependent variables are as follows: in column (1) a dummy where 1 corresponds
to the selfish choice9; in column (2) dictator’s beliefs on the percentage of recipients expecting them to be
selfish - SOB(7,3); in column (3) recipients beliefs on the percentage of dictators being selfish - FOB(7,3);
in column (4) participants’ beliefs on performing in the top quartile of the ranking in the e ort task -
Beliefs Top25; in column (5) the number of correct tables solved.
The analysis indicates that altruism is significantly a ected by positive AIP. Dictators in treatment
Positive - Timing 1 are 25% more likely to make the selfish choice compared to those in the baseline.
Dictators’ SOB(7,3) are also marginally a ected by that treatment - dictators that listened to the positive
music before making their choice believe that a higher proportion of recipients expect them to be selfish
9The results of the regression in (1) do not change using a Probit or Logit specification.
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compared to the baseline. All the other coe cients are not significantly di erent from zero. It is worth
noting that, in general, positive and negative AIPs do not produce opposite e ects on the variables under
analysis.











Timing of treatment: Timing 1 Timing 2 Timing 2 Timing 3 Timing 4
Negative 0.0239 0.0185 -0.0416 0.0345 -1.3427
(0.1059) (0.0499) (0.0530) (0.0660) (1.1563)
Positive 0.2484*** 0.0823* -0.0592 -0.0436 -0.2836
(0.1040) (0.0432) (0.0451) (0.0543) (1.0244)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181 181 183 364 364
R-squared 0.0578 0.0418 0.1008 0.0686 0.0814
Table 3: OLS Regressions - Average Treatment E ect. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive skills,
risk attitudes. Note: the baseline for the treatment in column (1) encompasses subjects in the neutral condition,
treatment at Timing 2, 3 and 4; in column (2) and (3) neutral condition, treatment at Timing 3 and 4; in column
(4) neutral condition and treatment at Timing 4; in column (5) neutral condition only.
Result 1 - On average, positive a ects cause more selfish behavior. Negative a ects have no impact
on altruistic behavior.
Result 2 - On average, incidental a ects have no impact on e ort.
Result 3 - On average, incidental a ects have no impact on beliefs, nor in the dictator game nor in the
e ort task.
4.3 Incidental a ects and heterogeneity
To test our conjecture that emotional intelligence can be relevant for the way people manage their beliefs
and make choices or perform under a ective activation, we conduct a heterogeneity analysis using the
measure of emotional intelligence introduced in section 3. We estimate:
Yi = ↵ +  1Treatmenti +  2Treatmenti ⇥TEIQue-SFi +  3TEIQue-SFi +  1Xi,1 + ...+  M Xi,M + ✏i (5)
where TEIQue-SF is the centred measure of trait emotional intelligence (Petrides, 2009). The rest of
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the equation is as described in section 4.2. The analysis using the emotional ‘ability’ approach does not
yield significant results and it is presented in Appendix I.











Timing of treatment: Timing 1 Timing 2 Timing 2 Timing 3 Timing 4
Negative ⇥ TEI -0.0311 -0.0580 0.1084* -0.2398** 1.0033
(0.1343) (0.0522) (0.0603) (0.1036) (1.5207)
Positive ⇥ TEI 0.2000* -0.1047** 0.0201 -0.1465** -1.0168
(0.1165) (0.0512) (0.0678) (0.0714) (1.7374)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181 181 183 364 364
R-squared 0.0859 0.0846 0.1467 0.0943 0.1036
Table 4: OLS Regressions - Heterogeneity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive
skills, risk attitudes. Note: the baseline for the treatment in column (1) encompasses subjects in the neutral
condition, treatment at Timing 2, 3 and 4; in column (2) and (3) neutral condition, treatment at Timing 3
and 4; in column (4) neutral condition and treatment at Timing 4; in column (5) neutral condition only.
The results in table 4 suggest that participants with di erent levels of trait emotional intelligence might
manage their beliefs di erently in the presence of an exogenous a ective activation. Interestingly, both
AIPs move beliefs in the same direction suggesting that the shift in arousal (and not valence) might be
driving the results. We thus merge treatments with opposite valence and same timing to gain statistical
power. Moreover, we split the sample into three percentile according to the distribution of the TEIQue-SF
scores and run the regressions for beliefs on those tertiles. Table 5 reports the results for the top and
bottom tertiles.
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Bottom TEIQue-SF tertile Top TEIQue-SF tertile













Timing 1 -0.0235 -0.0431 0.0796 0.0263 0.0535 -0.1704**
(0.0656) (0.0685) (0.0722) (0.0625) (0.0544) (0.0708)
Timing 2 0.0790 -0.1136* 0.0482 -0.1229* 0.1953*** -0.1444**
(0.0624) (0.0662) (0.0673) (0.0645) (0.0656) (0.0730)
Timing 3 0.1543* -0.2982***
(0.0848) (0.0722)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 56 69 125 57 59 116
R-squared 0.1134 0.2162 0.1445 0.1762 0.3204 0.1755
Table 5: OLS Regressions - Sub-samples. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive skills, risk attitudes.
Note: the baseline for the treatment in column (1), (2), (4), and (5) encompasses subjects in the neutral condition,
treatment at Timing 3 and 4; in column (3) and (6) neutral condition and treatment at Timing 4.
The analysis suggests that the participants with high scores in TEIQue-SF (columns (3) to (6)) are
significantly a ected by the AIP both in the dictator game and e ort task. The recipients believe that an
additional 20% of the dictators made the selfish option compared to the baseline; the dictators believe that
-12% of the recipients expect them to be selfish; and the participants in the e ort task believe they are
almost 30% less likely to perform in the top quartile. The results for the recipients and beliefs in the e ort
task are highly significant, at least when the AIP is delivered right before the belief elicitation (Timing 2
for FOB(7,3) and Timing 3 for beliefs in the e ort task). For participants with low scores in TEIQue-SF,
the AIP generates at most weak e ects.
The e ect of the AIP seems to have little persistence: treatment at timing 1 does not have any
significant e ect on beliefs in the dictator game, and treatment at timing 1 and 2 generate a smaller
e ect compared to treatment at timing 3 on beliefs in the e ort task. The analysis has been repeated
considering TEIQue-SF score quartiles, and considering di erent sub-samples of participants and the
results are substantially confirmed (see Appendix J.1 and Appendix J.2).
In figure 5, we plot average beliefs by score in the TEIQue-SF. We observe a clear pattern for
participants with high trait emotional intelligence for which the AIP induces a shift with respect to the
baseline, confirming the results of the regression. In the following section, we explore three possible
mechanisms to explain the observed pattern.
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Figure 5: Beliefs in the dictator game and e ort task depending on the score in the TEIQue-SF. Green lines/indicators
refer to the bottom TEIQue-SF percentile, red to the middle, blue to the top tertile. Light coloured lines with circle
hollow markers show baseline, bright lines and circle markers treated. The top left panel shows mean dictators’ SOB
(treatment=Timing 2), the top right panel shows mean recipients’ FOB (treatment=Timing 2), and the bottom panel
shows beliefs of performing in the top quartile in the e ort task (treatment=Timing 3).




In the previous section, we show that the AIP induces significant variation in beliefs for participants
scoring high in TEIQue-SF. We explore three possible mechanisms.
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5.1.1 Delaying
The music introduces a 4-minute delay between the belief elicitation instructions and the response. It
might be this delay and not the a ective activation, that drives our results. This hypothesis would be
consistent with the fact that positive and negative AIPs generate e ects in the same direction.
Dictator game - Table 6 reports average beliefs split by response time and TEIQue-SF tertiles. Fast
response indicates participants whose response time is in the top tertile of the response time distribution,
slow response in the bottom. On average, slower response times are associated with beliefs nearer to the
equilibrium of the game - recipients expect dictators to be more selfish and dictators believe that more
recipients expect them to be selfish. However, we also notice that the di erence is significant using the
whole sample and mainly consistent across TEIQue-SF tertiles. It is thus unlikely for delay to be the main
drive behind the results presented in tables 4 and 5.
Whole sample Bottom TEI tertile Top TEI tertile
SOB(7,3) FOB(7,3) SOB(7,3) FOB(7,3) SOB(7,3) FOB(7,3)
Fast response .459 .435 .416 .464 .506 .411
Slow response .592 .568 .575 .636 .484 .545
Di erence .070** .133*** .159*** .172** -.021 .134**
Observations 125 121 42 44 37 40
Table 6: Dictator game - Average beliefs by response time. Stars refer to two-sided t-test of di erence in means.
Significance level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
E ort task - We conduct a similar analysis for beliefs about own performance in the e ort task.
Slower response times are associated with confidence and the e ect is consistent across TEIQue-SF
tertiles, although stronger for participants with low trait emotional intelligence. In our main analysis, we
find that the AIP generates less confidence in high TEIQue-SF scorers (see table 5) suggesting that the
AIP should not be considered a simple delay in response.
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Whole sample Bottom TEI tertile Top TEI tertile
Belief of scoring: Top 25% Top 50% Top 25% Top 50% Top 25% Top 50%
Fast response .397 .748 .325 .706 .477 .772
Slow response .543 .834 .581 .845 .550 .855
Di erence .146*** .086*** .256*** .138*** .073 .083*
Observations 243 243 79 79 82 82
Table 7: E ort task - Average beliefs by response time. Stars refer to two-sided t-test of di erence in means.
Significance level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
5.1.2 Rational anticipation
Are participants with high trait emotional intelligence best responding to how they expect the exogenous
a ective activation has influenced the decision/performance of others?
Dictator game - If we consider the experimental timeline outlined in table 1, we notice that Timing 2
treatments are happening after dictators make their choices and this is common knowledge for participants.
As a consequence, the change that we observe in recipients’ beliefs cannot be driven by them anticipating
that dictators become more selfish because of the AIP. And dictators, knowing that recipients have no
reason to change their first order beliefs, should keep their second order beliefs unchanged. Moreover,
if participants were trying to anticipate the e ect of the AIP on the counterpart, then Timing 1 (and not
Timing 2) treatments should be a significant predictor of dictator’s SOB. However, the regressions in table
5 shows that coe cients for Timing 1 are not significantly di erent from zero suggesting that the shift in
beliefs is not due to a rational anticipation mechanism.
E ort task - The results reported in table 5 suggest that participants with high trait emotional
intelligence are less confident after the AIP compared to the baseline. They might be anticipating that
they will do worse in the task compared to other participants. If rational anticipation is at play, beliefs
regarding whether other participants listened to the same music should be relevant as the ranking depends
on others’ performance. In the post-experimental questionnaire, we ask participants if they believe
that everybody in the lab listened to the same music during the experiment. Table 8 reports average
confidence in the e ort task by belief regarding other participants’ AIP. The variable seems to play no role
for confidence in the e ort task. We thus think that rational anticipation is unlikely to be the mechanism
driving our results.
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Whole sample Bottom TEI tertile Top TEI tertile
Belief of scoring: Top 25% Top 50% Top 25% Top 50% Top 25% Top 50%
Others listened to same music .471 .796 .564 .836 .394 .750
Others did not listen to same music .393 .742 .494 .800 .275 .700
Di erence .078 .054 .070 .036 .119 .050
Observations 51 51 20 20 16 16
Table 8: Average beliefs by beliefs on others’ AIP. Stars refer to two-sided t-test of di erence in means. Significance
level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
5.1.3 Strategic pessimism
Some authors in the psychological literature argue that people might strategically overestimate the likeli-
hood of a negative outcome (Weber, 1994) as a way of protecting themselves from the emotional reaction
should the negative outcome materialize (Shepperd et al., 2000; Risen and Gilovich, 2007). In fact,
unexpected outcomes have a greater emotional impact than expected ones (Mellers et al., 1997). Impor-
tantly, strategic pessimism would depend on how aroused a decision-maker is. Because arousal intensifies
emotional reactions, aroused decision-makers should overestimate the likelihood of a negative outcome
to a greater extent than non-aroused decision-makers (Vosgerau, 2010). In the context of our experiment,
strategic pessimism would predict that high TEIQue-SF scorers would overestimate the negative outcome
in the game since they are the ones that react more to the exogenous a ective activation (Furnham and
Petrides, 2003).
Dictator game - For the recipients, the negative outcome is the selfish choice of the dictators as this
generates the lowest payo  for them. Hence, strategic pessimism would predict an increase in FOB7,3.
The sign of the coe cient in column (5) of table 5 is consistent with what the theory would predict.
For the dictators, we assume that they can be averse to guilt (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). As
such, they bear a psychological cost if they disappoint their partner (i.e., if they keep more money than
their partner expects). For guilt averse dictators, the payo s associated with the available options are:
⇡(7,3) = 7   ✓i[SOB(5,5)(5   3) + SOB(3,7)(7   3)]
⇡(5,5) = 5   ✓i[SOB(3,7)(7   5)]
⇡(3,7) = 3
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where ✓i is guilt sensitivity - an individual time-invariant characteristic - and the terms in square
brackets correspond to the expected disappointment of the counterpart following each of the choice. If
a dictator makes the selfish choice, it has to be that ⇡(7,3)   ⇡(5,5) and ⇡(7,3)   ⇡(3,7). Thus, a ‘bad news’
corresponds to recipients expecting them to be more altruistic as this would increase the psychological
cost of guilt (or change the ranking of the payo s). Strategic pessimism would thus predict an increase in
SOB(5,5) and/or SOB(3,7). If we consider dictators choosing the fair split, their guilt would increase with
higher SOB(3,7). In table 9 we compare SOB(5,5) and SOB(3,7) in treatment Timing 2 to the baseline across
dictators’ choices and TEIQue-SF tertiles.
Bottom TEI tertile Top TEI tertile
Dictator choice: Selfish Altruistic Selfish Altruistic
Average beliefs: SOB(5,5) SOB(3,7) SOB(3,7) SOB(5,5) SOB(3,7) SOB(3,7)
Baseline .279 .117 .166 .298 .087 .142
Timing 2 .271 .064 .109 .289 .139 .177
Di erence -.008 -.053 -.057 -.009 .052* .036
Observations 21 21 35 28 28 29
Table 9: Average dictators’ SOB by response time. Stars refer to one-sided t-test of di erence in means.
Significance level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
The results are weakly consistent with the strategic pessimism hypothesis. The SOB(5,5) remain
statistically unchanged, regardless of the dictators’ decision and TEIQue-SF score. For dictators in the
bottom TEI tertile, we see that beliefs SOB(3,7) tend to decrease after the treatment compared to the control
condition. To the contrary, for dictators in the top TEI tertile, we find that dictators have higher SOB(3,7)
after the treatment. The e ect, however, is only marginally significant. It is worth noticing that participants
with high trait emotional intelligence are also the ones more sensitive to guilt as we observe a significant
positive correlation between TEIQue-SF scores and the two scales of the GASP questionnaire - negative
behavior evaluation (Pearson’s correlation=0.1085, p-value<0.05, sample size=364) and repair responses
to private transgressions (Pearson’s correlation=0.2385, p-value<0.001, sample size=364).10 Participants
in the top tertile have a significantly higher score in GASP negative behavior evaluation (di erence in
means=0.3991, p-value<0.05) and GASP repair (di erence in means=0.5951, p-value<0.001) compared
10Guilt negative behavior evaluation items describe feeling bad about how one acted. Guilt–repair items describe action
tendencies (i.e., behavior or behavioral intentions) focused on correcting or compensating for the transgression.
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to participants in the bottom tertile.
E ort task - Strategic pessimism would predict a decrease in the probability of performing in the
first and second quartile for high TEIQue-SF scorers. The results presented in table 5 support this
hypothesis as we notice a significant decrease in the probability attributed to scoring in the top quartile
in the task for high TEIQue-SF scorers. We repeated the regression using beliefs on scoring in the top
half of the distribution and the coe cient of Timing 3 is still significant (coe cient Timing 3=-13.4959,
p-value<0.05).
In conclusion, we believe that the reaction to the AIP of participants with high trait emotional
intelligence might be due to strategic pessimism.
5.2 Choices
Dictator game - According to guilt aversion theories (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), the psychological
cost of guilt associated with the available options (and thus the final payo s) depends on the dictators’
SOB. The design of the experiment allows us to use Timing 1 treatment to test whether dictators’ SOBs
are a ‘mediating variable’ (Mackinnon et al., 2007; Imai et al., 2010) for dictators’ choices. We estimate
the following system of equations:
SOBi = ↵3 + ⌧Timing1i +  3,1X3,1,i + ... +  3,M X3,M,i + ✏3,i (6)
Yi = ↵2 +  2Timing1i +  SOBi +  2,1X2,1,i + ... +  2,M X2,M,i + ✏2,i (7)
where Yi is the dictator’s choice (1=selfish choice, 0 otherwise), SOB the mediating variable. The
estimates of this system of equations intend to isolate two e ects. The first is given by  ̂2, which
measures the direct e ect of treatment on Yi. This corresponds to the e ect on choices of being assigned
to treatment Timing 1 once the relationship between variations in beliefs and choices is accounted for.
The second e ect is the indirect e ect of treatment on choices via changes in beliefs µ̂ = ⌧̂ ̂. The total
e ect of treatment is the sum of the direct and indirect e ects. We use the Quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo
approximation of King et al. (2000) to make statistical inference about µ̂. The parameters reported are
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the average of 100 draws.
Whole sample Bottom TEIQue-SF percentile Top TEIQue-SF percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Selfish choice
Mediator: Dictators’ SOB
 ̂ (Mediation e ect) 0.0576 0.0575 -0.0298 -0.2318 0.0471 0.0093
 ̂2 (Direct e ect) 0.1797* 0.1865* 0.2824 0.2363 0.3869** 0.4590**
Total e ect 0.2385** 0.2440** 0.2527 0.2131 0.4340** 0.4683**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 123 123 38 38 37 37
Table 10: Mediation analysis - Dictator game
Table 10 reports the results of the analysis using the whole sample and the top and bottom tertile of
the TEIQue-SF score distribution. We observe a significant direct e ect of the Timing 1 treatment on
dictator’s choice driven by the top percentile. The coe cient of the mediation e ect is in the expected
direction but does not reach statistical significance. It is worth emphasizing that the variation induced
by the AIP Timing 1 on dictators’ SOB is weak (see table 3 and 5) and the regression on the sub-sample
relies on a small number of observations making it di cult to precisely identify a mediation e ect.
Result 5 - We do not find evidence of a mediation e ect of beliefs on choices in the dictator game.
E ort task - Various authors have argued that confidence might act as a motivational boost. Bénabou
and Tirole (2002) stress the importance of self-confidence as it improves individuals’ motivation to
undertake projects and persevere in the pursuit of goals. The link between self-confidence and motivation
is also pervasive in the psychology literature (see, for instance, James, 1890; Bandura, 1977; Deci,
1975). In motivation research, expectations that fall below one’s goals lead to reduced e ort, goal
abandonment, and lower achievement (Bandura and Cervone, 1986; Cervone, 1993; Locke and Latham,
1990). Confidence has been shown to be an important outcome explaining leadership among young
adults (Alan and Ertac, 2019), intergenerational income mobility (Blanden et al., 2007) and academic
performance of students (Golsteyn et al., 2017).
Our experimental design allows us to run a mediation analysis and estimate the indirect impact that a
reduction in confidence has on performance. We estimate equations 6 and 7 using the number of correct
table as Yi and beliefs on performing in top quartile as the mediating variable.
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Whole sample Bottom TEIQue-SF percentile Top TEIQue-SF percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Correct tables
Mediator: Beliefs on top quartile
 ̂ (Mediation e ect) -0.0461 -0.0450 0.1489 0.1477 -0.8972* -1.1970**
 ̂2 (Direct e ect) 0.0041 -0.0031 0.2186 -0.0277 -0.3367 -0.3383
Total e ect -0.0420 -0.0481 0.3676 0.1200 -1.2340** -1.5353**
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79 79 29 29 26 26
Table 11: Mediation analysis - E ort task
Table 11 reports the result of the estimation. We observe a significant mediation e ect only for
participants scoring high in TEIQue-SF. The mediation e ect corresponds to a decrease of a little more
than 1 correct table solved in the game. Considering that the average number of tables that high TEIQue-
SF scorers solve correctly is 13.08, the decrease in confidence induced by the AIP generates a reduction
of 9% in performance.
Result 6 - We find evidence of a mediation e ect of confidence on performance in the e ort task
for participants scoring high in TEIQue-SF. The mediation e ect corresponds to a reduction of 9% in
performance.
6 Conclusions
This research uses a lab experiment to explore how incidental a ects influence beliefs management and
decision-making in two economically relevant situations - a bargaining game and an e ort task. The
analysis reveals that incidental a ects make dictators significantly more selfish. Our treatments also show
that participants with high trait emotional intelligence strategically manage their beliefs when under the
influence of an exogenous a ective activation.
Our contribution is empirical as well as methodological. We design and test a novel a ect induction
procedure with minimal demand e ect or priming potential, and strong e cacy. We compare decisions
and beliefs under the e ect of incidental a ects with a baseline where participants’ a ective states remain
untouched. Our experimental design allows us to separately study the e ect of a change in valence
combined with an increase in arousal on belief management and decision-making. To a large extent, the
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results of our experiment disconfirm the existing evidence on the topic and point to a note of caution in
the study of emotions and decision-making as many factors can confound the results. We believe that our
results are particularly robust as our design is minimizing such confounding.
Our results point to the capacity, for a substantial proportion of people, of strategically managing their
beliefs in an attempt to cope with the emotional consequences of the choices that they and others make.
Our study provides evidence that beliefs do not always reflect the individuals’ knowledge concerning the
state of the world and strategic pessimism might be one of the mechanisms through which people form
beliefs. Finally, our study lends support to belief-dependent theories through a novel experimental design
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Online Appendix
A Appendix: Pilot sessions - Experimental instructions
All the information concerning the experiment appeared directly on the screen. Participants were not
given any written instructions. Here we report the screenshots for the test of the positive valence music
tracks. Participants testing the negative valence music tracks received exactly the same instructions but
listened to di erent audio recordings. Participants in the neutral condition answered the same question









B Appendix: Music appreciation and valence
According to our pilot sessions, two of the music tracks that were supposed to increase negative a ects
- Holst and Moussorgosky - provoked an increase in positive a ects. We analysed the answers to the
question ‘Did you like the music?’ in the post-experimental questionnaire as we hypothezise an interaction
between music appreciation and valence. To answer the question, participants state how much they liked
the music on a 5-Likert scale, from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Extremely’. Table B1 report Pearson correlation values
between music taste and SAM, A ect grid, and PANAS answers.
Music appreciation
Arousal - SAM 0.0351
Arousal - A ect Grid 0.0047
Valence - SAM 0.7724***
Valence - A ect Grid 0.8638***
Positive emotions PANAS 0.7591***
Negative emotions PANAS -0.6118***
Table B1: Correlation valence and music appreciation.
Pearson correlation; *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Sam-
ple size: 46.
We observe a strong positive (or negative) correlation between how much participants like the music
and how much they report positive (or negative) a ects. There is no correlation between arousal and
music appreciation. Figure B1 show the level of appreciation by music track. Holst and Moussorgosky
have high levels of appreciation which explain the high values of positive valence reported after listening
to those tracks.
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Figure B1: Average music appreciation (median, 25th and 75th percentiles,
dots are outside values)
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C Appendix: Experimental instructions
All the information concerning the experiment appeared directly on the screen. Participants were not
given any written instructions. Here we report the screenshots from a session using music with negative




























All the information concerning the task appeared directly on the screen. All participants faced the same
items. Before the task, we distributed a handout with a definition of the emotions which appeared in the
multiple choices.
Read the mind in the eyes
We selected 4 items of the ‘Read the mind in the eyes’ test revised version (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).




The selection was based on the level of di culty associated with each item. The di culty is calculated
as the percentage of people that correctly identified the emotion expressed in the eyes (the higher the
percentage the lower the di culty level). We selected two easy and two hard items. For more details, we
refer to the paper by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001).
Read the mind in the voice
We selected 4 items of the ‘Read the mind in the voice’ test revised (Golan et al., 2007). Participants
listened three times to the audio before being able to give their answer and proceed. The screenshots




The selection was based on the level of di culty associated with each item. As before, the di culty
is calculated as the percentage of people that correctly identified the emotion expressed in the eyes (the
higher the percentage the lower the di culty level). We selected two easy and two hard items. For more
details, we refer to the paper by Golan et al. (2006).
Read the mind in films
We selected 4 items of the ‘Read the mind in films’ task Golan et al. (2007). Participants watched each
video three times before being able to give their answer and proceed. The screenshots reported below





The verbal recognition of emotions is a self-designed short test intended to measure the ability to describe
emotions in words.
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C.4 Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire - Short Form
Instructions: Please answer each statement below by putting a circle around the number that best reflects
your degree of agreement or disagreement with that statement. Do not think too long about the exact
meaning of the statements. Work quickly and try to answer as accurately as possible. There are no
right or wrong answers. There are seven possible responses to each statement ranging from ‘Completely
Disagree’ (number 1) to ‘Completely Agree’ (number 7).
• Expressing my emotions with words is not a problem for me
• I often find it di cult to see things from another person’s viewpoint.
• On the whole, I’m a highly motivated person.
• I usually find it di cult to regulate my emotions.
• I generally don’t find life enjoyable.
• I can deal e ectively with people.
• I tend to change my mind frequently.
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• Many times, I can’t figure out what emotion I’m feeling.
• I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
• I often find it di cult to stand up for my rights.
• I’m usually able to influence the way other people feel.
• On the whole, I have a gloomy perspective on most things.
• Those close to me often complain that I don’t treat them right.
• I often find it di cult to adjust my life according to the circumstances.
• On the whole, I’m able to deal with stress.
• I often find it di cult to show my a ection to those close to me.
• I’m normally able to ‘get into someone’s shoes’ and experience their emotions.
• I normally find it di cult to keep myself motivated.
• I’m usually able to find ways to control my emotions when I want to.
• On the whole, I’m pleased with my life.
• I would describe myself as a good negotiator.
• I tend to get involved in things I later wish I could get out of.
• I often pause and think about my feelings.
• I believe I’m full of personal strengths.
• I tend to ‘back down’ even if I know I’m right.
• I don’t seem to have any power at all over other people’s feelings.
• I generally believe that things will work out fine in my life.
• I find it di cult to bond well even with those close to me.
• Generally, I’m able to adapt to new environments.
• Others admire me for being relaxed.
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D Appendix: Details on experimental sessions
Table D1 reports details on the experimental sessions. All the sessions have been run at the EssexLab of
the University of Essex.
Treatment Participants Date Starting time Duration
Session 1 N1 28 12/07/2018 14.00 90 min
Session 2 P1 28 12/07/2018 16.30 85 min
Session 3 N2 24 16/07/2018 14.00 95 min
Session 4 P2 20 16/07/2018 16.30 80 min
Session 5 P3 28 11/10/2018 14.00 80 min
Session 6 N3 24 11/10/2018 16.30 85 min
Session 7 P2 28 12/10/2018 14.00 85 min
Session 8 Baseline 28 12/10/2018 16.30 90 min
Session 9 P2 20 25/10/2018 13.05 80 min
Session 10 N1 24 26/11/2018 11.45 90 min
Session 11 P1 32 26/11/2018 14.00 85 min
Session 12 N2 28 26/11/2018 16.30 90 min
Session 13 P4 32 18/11/2019 14.00 80 min
Session 14 N4 24 18/11/2019 16.30 85 min
Table D1: Schedule of experimental sessions
Four observations were dropped from the analysis. Three participants had to leave before the end of
the sessions (Session 5, and Session 9 twice), producing incomplete data. One participant was unable to
understand any probability concept and could not complete the belief elicitation task without the help of
the lab assistant (Session 12). Table D2 show the sample size by treatment.
HP treatment Participants HN treatment Participants
HP-T1 60 HN-T1 52
HP-T2 66 HN-T2 51
HP-T3 27 HN-T3 24
HP-T4 32 HN-T4 24
Baseline 28
Table D2: Sample size by treatment
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E Appendix: Random assignment check
Table E1 and E2 report regressions of observables on treatments dummies. The percentage of female in
the neutral condition (78%) is significantly higher than that in most of the treatments. None of the other
observables is significantly predicted by the treatment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age Female Education Students Siblings Music
Negative - Timing 1 1.3104 -0.1896 0.0907 -0.0055 -0.3352 0.0616
(2.3613) (0.1161) (0.1516) (0.0721) (0.3776) (0.1178)
Positive - Timing 1 0.2310 -0.3024*** 0.1214 -0.0119 -0.7429** -0.0619
(2.3056) (0.1134) (0.1480) (0.0704) (0.3687) (0.1147)
Negative - Timing 2 4.1751* -0.2171* 0.0371 -0.1246* -0.1232 0.0616
(2.3694) (0.1165) (0.1521) (0.0724) (0.3789) (0.1178)
Positive - Timing 2 1.0476 -0.2706** 0.0942 -0.0346 -0.1580 0.0260
(2.2720) (0.1117) (0.1458) (0.0694) (0.3633) (0.1130)
Negative - Timing 3 -1.9524 -0.3274** 0.0714 0.0714 -0.7679* 0.0714
(2.8022) (0.1378) (0.1799) (0.0856) (0.4481) (0.1394)
Positive - Timing 3 0.6587 -0.2302* -0.0675 -0.1138 -0.4392 0.1270
(2.7171) (0.1336) (0.1744) (0.0830) (0.4345) (0.1351)
Negative - Timing 4 -3.5774 -0.3690*** -0.0536 0.0714 -0.7679* 0.1964
(2.6002) (0.1381) (0.1705) (0.0788) (0.4360) (0.1390)
Positive - Timing 4 -3.8482 -0.2232* 0.0089 0.0714 -0.3616 -0.0536
(2.4188) (0.1285) (0.1586) (0.0733) (0.4056) (0.1293)
Observations 364 364 364 364 364 363
R-squared 0.0576 0.0295 0.0096 0.0501 0.0289 0.0201
Table E1: Random assignment check (1). Standard deviation in parenthesis. Significance level *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Excluded category: neutral condition. Music indicates whether the participants has
experience in playing an instrument.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
IQ Risk aversion TEIQue-SF Emot. ability
Negative - Timing 1 0.1621 0.7225* -0.0090 -0.0824
(0.1746) (0.3673) (0.1790) (0.5481)
Positive - Timing 1 0.2262 0.1905 -0.1872 -0.2619
(0.1705) (0.3586) (0.1748) (0.5352)
Negative - Timing 2 0.1870 0.2591 0.0956 -0.4090
(0.1752) (0.3685) (0.1796) (0.5500)
Positive - Timing 2 0.0747 0.5390 -0.0482 0.1017
(0.1680) (0.3534) (0.1722) (0.5274)
Negative - Timing 3 0.1845 -0.0595 -0.0847 -0.9286
(0.2072) (0.4359) (0.2124) (0.6505)
Positive - Timing 3 0.0410 0.0238 -0.1478 0.2751
(0.2009) (0.4226) (0.2060) (0.6307)
Negative - Timing 4 0.3929* 0.6071 -0.2861 -0.1786
(0.2042) (0.4333) (0.2088) (0.6520)
Positive - Timing 4 0.0491 0.6071 -0.2073 -0.8036
(0.1899) (0.4031) (0.1942) (0.6065)
Observations 364 364 364 364
R-squared 0.0180 0.0288 0.0217 0.0204
Table E2: Random assignment check (2). Standard deviation in parenthesis. Significance level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Excluded category: neutral condition.
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F Appendix: Emotional intelligence randomization check
F.1 Emotional ability
Figure F1 shows the range of values and means of the emotional ability task scores across treatments (left
figure) and 95% confidence interval (right figure). The task scores seem to be balanced across treatments.
We perform a pairwise comparison across treatments from a linear regression model where emotional
ability is regressed on treatment dummies. The results indicate that only a few pairwise di erences are
marginally significant (Positive - Timing 2 and Positive - Timing 4, Positive - Timing 3 and Positive -
Timing 4, Positive -Timing 3 and Negative - Timing 3).
Figure F1: Left: range of values and means of the TEIQue-SF by treatment. Right: means of the TEIQue-SF by
treatment with 95% confidence intervals
Another concern might be that the AIP influences the response to the emotional ability task. We can
rule out this concern for two reasons. First, the mean values in the baseline condition are not significantly
di erent from the rest of the treatments. Second, if we regress our measure of emotional ability on













Table F1: Treatment timing and emotional abil-
ity. Standard deviation in parenthesis. Signifi-
cance level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Excluded category: neutral condition.
F.2 Trait Emotional Intelligence
Figure F2 shows the range of values and means of the TEIQue-SF scores across treatments (left figure) and
95% confidence interval (right figure). The questionnaire scores seem to be balanced across treatments.
We perform a pairwise comparison across treatments from a linear regression model where TEIQue-
SF is regressed on treatment dummies. The results indicate that the only significant di erences in
means are between Negative - Timing 2 and: Positive - Timing 1 (di erence=0.2828, p-value=0.049),
Negative - Timing 4 (di erence=-0.3817, p-value=0.041), and Positive - Timing 4 (di erence=-0.3029,
p-value=0.074).
Figure F2: Left: range of values and means of the TEIQue-SF by treatment. Right: means of the TEIQue-SF by
treatment with 95% confidence intervals
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Another concern might be that the AIP influences the response to the questionnaire. We can rule out
this concern for three reasons. First, it should be noted that there is a minimum interval of 30 minutes (in
Timing 4 treatments) between the AIP and the questionnaire. During the interval, participants complete
a series of tasks (risk task, IQ type questions, and emotion ability questions). Second, the mean values in
the baseline condition are not significantly di erent from the rest of the treatments. Third, if we regress
TEIQue-SF on dummies indicating the timing of treatment (table F2), none of the coe cient is significant












Table F2: Treatment timing and TEIQue-SF
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G Appendix: Descriptives
Variable name Value Range Mean (SD) Min Value Max Value
Dictator’s choice (discrete) 1-3 1.55 (0.5) 1 3
Recipient’s first order beliefs on (7,3) 0-1 0.49 (0.22) 0.05 1
Recipient’s first order beliefs on (5,5) 0-1 0.40 (0.19) 0 0.90
Recipient’s first order beliefs on (3,7) 0-1 0.11 (0.11) 0 0.9
Dictator’s second order beliefs on (7,3) 0-1 0.49 (0.19) 0 1
Dictator’s second order beliefs on (5,5) 0-1 0.37 (0.15) 0 0.75
Dictator’s second order beliefs on (3,7) 0-1 0.14 (0.12) 0 0.75
Table G1: DG - Summary statistics. Dictator’s choice coding is as follow: 1 corresponds to (7, 3), 2 to
(5, 5), and 3 to (3, 7).
Variable name Value Range Mean (SD) Min Value Max Value
Beliefs on best quartile 0-1 0.45 (0.28) 0 1
Beliefs on second best quartile 0-1 0.33 (0.19) 0 1
Beliefs on second worst quartile 0-1 0.15 (0.15) 0 1
Beliefs on worst quartile 0-1 0.68 (0.89) 0 0.7
Number of correct tables completed 0-26 13.66 (4.09) 1 26
Number of attempted tables 1-40 16.97 (3.96) 3 29
Accuracy in counting tables 0-1 0.80 (0.13) 0.17 0.96
Table G2: ET - Summary statistics
Variable name Value Range Mean (SD) Min Value Max Value
TEIQue-SF 0-7 4.96 (0.75) 2.7 6.53
TEI Well Being 0-7 5.36 (1.08) 1.33 7
TEI Emotionality 0-7 5.02 (0.88) 2.88 7
TEI Self-control 0-7 4.47 (1.05) 1.17 6.67
TEI Sociability 0-7 4.99 (0.97) 2.17 7
TEI Emotion Regulation 0-7 4.65 (1.01) 1.25 7
Ability to recognize emotions 0-16 11.21 (2.34) 5 16
Eyes 0-4 3.19 (0.85) 0 4
Voices 0-4 2.57 (1.01) 0 4
Video 0-4 2.71 (0.96) 0 4
Words 0-4 2.73 (1.08) 0 4
Table G3: Emotional intelligence - Summary statistics
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H Appendix: Emotional intelligence and demographics
Table H1 reports pairwise correlation coe cients between the two measures of emotional intelligence
and demographics. Emotional ‘ability’ does not correlate significantly with any variable. Trait emotional
intelligence is positively correlated with age and marginally with risk aversion but not with other variables.
The two measures of emotional intelligence are not correlated between them (Pearson’s correlation






Number of siblings 0.0018 -0.0097
Music -0.0086 -0.0117
IQ -0.0009 -0.0648
Risk Aversion 0.0322 0.0887*
Table H1: Pairwise correlation. Significance level *p < 0.1, **p <
0.05, ***p < 0.01. Music indicates whether the participants has
experience in playing an instrument. Sample size: 364.
170
I Appendix: Analysis with emotional ability
We estimate the following equation:
Yi = ↵ +  1Treatmenti +  2Treatmenti ⇥ EAi +  3EAi +  1Xi,1 + ... +  M Xi,M + ✏i (8)
where EAi is the measure of emotional intelligence presented in section 3 as belonging to the ‘ability’
approach. The rest of the equation is as described in section 4.3. Emotional ability is centred around the
mean.











Timing of treatment: Timing 1 Timing 2 Timing 2 Timing 3 Timing 4
Negative ⇥ EA -0.0179 0.0127 -0.0145 0.0096 -0.4961
(0.0580) (0.0224) (0.0270) (0.0244) (0.4582)
Positive ⇥ EA -0.0193 -0.0118 0.0050 0.0051 -0.3446
(0.0459) (0.0177) (0.0161) (0.0185) (0.4254)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 181 181 183 364 364
R-squared 0.0658 0.0583 0.1214 0.0733 0.1034
Table I1: OLS Regressions - Average Treatment E ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive
skills, risk attitudes.
Bottom EA percentile Top EA percentile













Timing 1 0.0754 0.0064 -0.0365 0.0195 -0.0292 0.1712**
(0.0558) (0.0796) (0.0658) (0.0591) (0.0863) (0.0804)
Timing 2 0.0129 0.0246 -0.0662 0.0328 -0.0456 0.1420*
(0.0654) (0.0704) (0.0695) (0.0605) (0.0768) (0.0721)
Timing 3 -0.0141 0.0612
(0.0777) (0.0831)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66 68 134 56 57 113
R-squared 0.2372 0.0977 0.0806 0.1874 0.1845 0.1199
Table I2: OLS Regressions, split sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive skills, risk attitudes.
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J Appendix: Robustness checks
J.1 Analysis using Trait Emotional Intelligence quartiles
Bottom TEIQue-SF quartile Top TEIQue-SF quartile













Timing 1 -0.0241 -0.0618 0.0791 -0.0636 0.0128 -0.1775*
(0.0764) (0.0791) (0.0805) (0.0673) (0.0717) (0.0930)
Timing 2 0.0390 -0.0532 0.0383 -0.1909*** 0.1493* -0.1697*
(0.0798) (0.0783) (0.0782) (0.0652) (0.0875) (0.0985)
Timing 3 0.0533 -0.3324***
(0.1006) (0.1011)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43 53 96 42 42 84
R-squared 0.1658 0.2511 0.1540 0.3323 0.2226 0.1584
Table J1: OLS Regressions, split sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive skills, risk attitudes.
J.2 Regression analysis on treated
Exploiting the correlation between music appreciation and AIP e cacy (see B), we construct a sub-sample
of ‘treated’ participants by dropping form participants who liked at least ‘Moderately’ (i.e., score above
3) Merzbow and ‘Not at all’ or ‘A little’ (i.e., score below 3) Delibes. We then repeat the the analysis of
section 4.2 and 4.3 on the sub-sample of ‘treated’.











Timing of treatment: Timing 1 Timing 2 Timing 2 Timing 3 Timing 4
Negative 0.0734 0.0125 -0.0661 -0.0022 -1.2852
(0.1253) (0.0598) (0.0559) (0.0725) (1.1607)
Positive 0.2629** 0.0700 -0.0857* -0.0652 -0.3609
(0.1210) (0.0488) (0.0494) (0.0588) (1.0542)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 157 304 304
R-squared 0.0786 0.0542 0.0871 0.0680 0.0859
Table J2: OLS Regressions - Average treatment e ect on treated. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education,
cognitive skills, risk attitudes.
172











Timing of treatment: Timing 1 Timing 2 Timing 2 Timing 3 Timing 4
Negative ⇥ TEI -0.0127 -0.0635 0.1230** -0.2530** 0.9232
(0.1510) (0.0506) (0.0622) (0.1054) (1.4995)
Positive ⇥ TEI 0.3348*** -0.1279** -0.0042 -0.1226 -1.5885
(0.1133) (0.0594) (0.0734) (0.0756) (1.7724)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 157 304 304
R-squared 0.1182 0.1221 0.1308 0.1019 0.1177
Table J3: OLS Regressions - Treated subsample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive skills,
risk attitudes.
Bottom TEIQue-SF percentile Top TEIQue-SF percentile













Timing 1 -0.0591 -0.0482 0.0505 -0.0443 0.0409 -0.1524**
(0.0782) (0.0743) (0.0752) (0.0574) (0.0580) (0.0751)
Timing 2 0.0734 -0.1311* 0.0329 -0.1669** 0.1759** -0.1747**
(0.0647) (0.0769) (0.0756) (0.0659) (0.0733) (0.0749)
Timing 3 0.1714* -0.3328***
(0.0908) (0.0751)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46 58 104 46 53 99
R-squared 0.1621 0.1726 0.1470 0.2598 0.2863 0.2235
Table J4: OLS Regressions, split sample - Treated subsample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
level *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Controls: age, gender, number of siblings, education, cognitive skills,
risk attitudes.
